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I. THE MINNEAPOLIS MANIFESTO
What is America's true national pastime, baseball or boon-
doggles? Many cities and states no longer need to choose.
They have both. Buffeted by market forces that tilt athletic
talent and titles toward larger cities,' state and local governments
are stretching their budgets and their legal imaginations in an
effort to retain or attract sports teams. Direct grants and a
dazzling array of bonds and tax preferences are building new
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School
<chenx064@maroon.tc.ummedu>. I thank Daniel A. Farber, Philip P. Frickey,
Barry Friedman, Robert E. Hudec, and Walter Hellerstein for their helpful
suggestions and comments. Betsey Buckheit provided able research assistance.
1. See Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market
Teams in Major League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323 (1994); Matthew J.
Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from
Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competi-
tion, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L.
REV. 57 (1997).
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stadiums all over. To some, multiplier effects and intangible
benefits merit public investment in major league sports. For
boosters, the exodus of professional sports marks the beginning
of irreversible urban decay. As Hubert Humphrey reputedly
said, Minneapolis without the Minnesota Twins would become
a "cold Omaha."2 Opponents argue that public money should
buy things besides luxury skyboxes. Vehement opposition to
public investment in sports cathedrals has produced a new
battle cry: "Separation of sports and state!"3
For a sport that is "not a subject of [interstate] commerce,"4
major league baseball has figured prominently in a torrid con-
stitutional debate. The struggle for sports subsidies is merely
one manifestation of the race among state and local governments
to finance favored businesses. In 1994, voices from a Minneapolis-
based institution entered the debate. The institution was neither
church nor state, but an organization that blends elements of
both and arguably affects more lives than either: a Federal Re-
serve Bank. In the 1994 report of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis,5 Melvin Burstein and Arthur Rolnick decried the
2. See, e.g., Patrick Reusse, We'd Be Idiots to Pass Up Chance at an NEL
Team, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 12, 1995, at 4C; cf. Paul Klauda, Census
Bureau Finds Fewer Twin Cities Noses, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 22,
1989, at 1B (noting that 1988 Census Bureau estimates had placed Omaha
ahead of Minneapolis in population). Des Moines has displaced Omaha as the
butt of sports jokes in Minnesota. See, e.g., Joe Soucheray, Arne Double Drib-
bles on Gopher Game Day, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 19, 1997, at 1B
(quoting Minnesota Gov. Arne Carlson's opinion of Des Moines, expressed on
the eve of a basketball game between the Universities of Minnesota and Iowa:
"It's dead, ... absolutely dead."). Lest some readers swoon from Nebraskan
or Iowan pride, one should remember that it would be truly insulting to de-
scribe Omaha or Des Moines as a "warm Saint Paul."
3. See, e.g., Barry M. Bloom, Public Speaks Up on Baseball-Only Sta-
dium Issue, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRm., June 24, 1997, at B1; Letters to the
Editor, PrITSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, June 16, 1997, at A10 ("Separation of
sports and state looks like a good idea."); Letters from Readers, STAR-TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 19, 1997, at 12A ("I would like to propose an amendment
to the U.S. Constitution that ensures the separation of sports and state.");
Letters, Cm1. SUN-TIMES, June 14, 1990, at 40 ("[Tlhe real issue we face is de-
veloping a separation between 'sports and state.' When did government get
into the sports business?").
4. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922);
accord Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972).
5. Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the
Economic War Among the States, THE REGION, March 1995, at 3 (quarterly
journal of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), reprinted in Melvin
Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War Among
the States, 10 STATE TAX NOTES 1895 (1996). Subsequent citations to this
source will refer to the version in State Tax Notes.
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proliferation of subsidies and tax preferences designed to lure
or retain employers ranging from "airline maintenance facili-
ties, automobile assembly plants, and professional sports
teams to... chopstick factories and corn processing facilities."6
This report, notorious enough to be called the "Minneapolis
Manifesto," argued that local business incentives destroy more
wealth than they create, not only by diverting scarce fiscal re-
sources, but also by distorting private investment decisions.'
Furthermore, Burstein and Rolnick placed no confidence in the
Supreme Court's ability to stop this corrosive competition.8 In-
stead, they urged "Congress, with its sweeping constitutional
powers, ... to end this economic war among the states."9
The Manifesto inspired not one but two academic conferences.
The first, held on May 21-22, 1996, in Washington, D.C., ad-
dressed Burstein and Rolnick's specific recommendations."' On
May 2-3, 1997, the Minneapolis Fed and the University of
Minnesota Law School cosponsored a second conference, with
the expanded theme of "The Law and Economics of Federal-
ism." This Symposium publishes five of the papers presented
at that conference.
Part II of this foreword revisits the legal milieu in which
the Minneapolis Manifesto emerged. Since the pivotal year of
1994, the Supreme Court's case law on federalism has ex-
ploded. Part HI places the Symposium within this jurispru-
dential context. Parts IV and V offer some preliminary (and
surely premature) thoughts on economic analysis of federalism.
Federalism, the "oldest question of [American] constitutional
law,"" the prime mover in a system where nearly every consti-
tutional case "is a case about federalism,"12 defines the newest
legal challenges in a mercilessly competitive global economy.' 3
In a world where virtually every legal endeavor is transforming
6. Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 5, at 1895.
7. See id. at 1896-98.
8. See id. at 1898-99.
9. Id. at 1900.
10. See generally The Economic War Among the States, THE REGION, June
1996, at 1 (reporting the proceedings of the Washington conference).
11. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992); see also H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. RBv. 633
(1993).
12. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991).
13. See generally Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Vil-
lage, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441 (1994).
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"from a strictly local undertaking into a global commitment," 4
one must strain to find "any subject that [is] effectively con-
trolled by a single national sovereign."" Part IV revisits that
cause cglbre of commerce clause jurisprudence, Wickard v.
Filburn.16 A forgotten footnote in Filburn offers a novel per-
spective on federalism. Part V anticipates what Filburn's for-
gotten footnote might teach us about the fundamental nature
of the state.
II. NINETEEN NINETY-FOUR
A. MY FAVORITE YEAR
Annus mirabilis to some,17 annus horribilis to others, 8
1994 was a year of "[s]trange portents" for federalism around
the world. 9 The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) took effect on January 1.20 Austria, Finland, and
Sweden joined the European Union, while Norway declined the
invitation to push Europe further toward political integration.2
Diplomats in Marrakesh on April 15 witnessed the birth of the
World Trade Organization, the most significant step toward
global free trade in five decades.22 Even legal scholars com-
14. Jim Chen, Fugitives and Agrarians in a World Without Frontiers, 18
CARDozo L. REV. 1031, 1051 (1996).
15. John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U.
PA. J. INr' ECON. L. 17, 25 (1996).
16. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. Cf Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings,
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 695, 695 & n.1 (1996) (reminiscing about a year of miracles "roughly
'[bletween the end of the Chatterley ban [a]nd the Beatles' first LP'" (quoting
PHILIP LARKIN, Annus Mirabilis, in COLLECTED POEMS 167, 167 (Anthony
Thwaite ed., 1988)).
18. Cf M.D.A. Freeman, Annual Survey of Family Law 1992 England:
1992 as Annus Horribilis, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 293, 293 (1993-94) ("As
is well-known, the Queen described 1992 as her 'annus horribilis.'").
19. ROBERT GRAVES, CLAUDIUS THE GOD 417 (Penguin 1954).
20. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
21. See Treaties & Final Acts, June 24, 1994, E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 86
(1994) (enabling Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden to join the European
Union). See generally Dierk Booss & John Forman, Enlargement: Legal and
Procedural Aspects, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 95 (1995); Roger J. Goebel, The
European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria,
Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092 (1995).
22. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
April 15, 1994, reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF
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memorated these cataclysmic coincidences, comparing Ameri-
can federalism with its European23 and GATT 24 analogues.
Menaced simultaneously by decentralization and globalization,
the nation-state seemed on the verge of losing its longstanding
legal primacy.2 "Prodigies enough, soothsayers?"26
This season of legal change also swept through the United
States. Stressing the devolution of power to the states, Repub-
licans won control of both houses of Congress for the first time
in four decades. Still hot from a 1992 decision that resusci-
tated the moribund Tenth Amendmenty2 7 the Supreme Court
agreed to review a Commerce Clause challenge to a federal ban
on gun possession near schools.28 That grant of certiorari fore-
bode an aggressive assault on federal authority. In each of the
three Terms beginning with October Term 1994, the Court
would invalidate acts of Congress on federalist grounds. In the
1994 Term, United States v. Lopez2 9 struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990. The next Term, the Court held that
the Commerce Clause gave Congress no power to abrogate the
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 5 (GATT Sec-
retariat 1995) [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND]; cf General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
23. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 403-
56 (1994); see also George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European Com-
munity, 17 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 98 (1993); Stephen Gardbaum,
Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 831-33 (1996).
See generally Jenna Bednar et al., The Politics of European Federalism, 16
INTrL REV. L. & EcoN. 279 (1996).
24- See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A GATI's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1411-31 (1994); see also Friedman, supra note 13
(discussing GATTs impact on the United States).
25. See generally Symposium, The Decline of the Nation State and Its Ef-
fects on Constitutional and International Economic Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
903 (1996).
26. GRAVES, supra note 19, at 418.
27. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (striking
down the "take title" provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985); cf. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1988 (1993) ("New York v. United States is
fascinating precisely because New York would have complied with congres-
sional commands to regulate waste had the Court ordered New York to do
so.").
28. See United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 1029 (1994), granting cert. to 2
F.Sd 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), affid, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29. 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
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sovereign immunity of the states under the Eleventh Amendment."
Finally, in the 1996 Term, the Court held that Congress could
not order state and local executive officers to enforce federal
gun control legislation.31 Three Terms, three eviscerated acts
of Congress. The centrifugal portents of 1994 had proved true.
Nevertheless, the death of nationalism in America is vastly
overstated. American federalism has proved supple enough to
meet its latest constitutional crises. Not quite a month after
deciding Lopez,32 the Court repelled an effort to impose state-
law term limits on members of Congress.33 In more transparently
economic cases, the Court has reaffirmed its own prerogative to
invalidate local laws. With an almost casual disregard for the
shadows it has cast on Congress's affirmative power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes,"34 the contemporary Court
has sustained, even strengthened, its dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. These decisions have vindicated James
Madison's belief that the interstate Commerce Clause was
principally as "a negative and preventive provision against in-
justice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to
be used for the positive purposes of the General Government."35
Dormant Commerce Clause decisions provide the ideal
laboratory for an economically literate analysis of federalism.
These cases supply not only compelling facts but also doctrinal
stability. Two decades have passed since the fateful day in
1976 when the Supreme Court decided both Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp.36 and National League of Cities v. Usery.37 A
careless observer might have been tempted to ignore Hughes
and regard Usery as the more enduring expression of American
federalism. Twenty-one years of legal hindsight suggest oth-
30. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
31. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
32. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (decided April 26, 1995).
33. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 827, 836 (1995)(decided May 22, 1995).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. James Madison, Letter to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 3
MAX FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478(1911); accord West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 D-9
(1994).
36. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
37. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Hughes and Usery were both decided on June 24,
1976.
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erwise. Although the market-participant doctrine established
by Hughes has flourished,38 Usery was unceremoniously
dumped within a decade as "unsound in principle and unworkable
in practice."39 Complain as we might about the "quagmire" of
dormant Commerce Clause cases,4° the doctrine has rested on
relatively firm constitutional ground.
Therefore, when dormant Commerce Clause doctrine visi-
bly shifts, the change is as noteworthy as any seismic shift.
Perhaps more so than any other recent year, 1994 exposed the fault
lines in this body of cases. No other constitutional provision
carried greater weight than the dormant Commerce Clause."
In that year of legal wonders, the Court invalidated four state
laws on this basis.42 Two of these cases, Associated Industries
v. Lohman43 and Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality," applied the basic principle that facial
discrimination against interstate commerce is well-nigh per se
unconstitutional.45 These cases' relative simplicity emerges
38. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980);
Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1995); Trojan
Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nid, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991). See generally Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenk-
kan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State Owned Resources,
59 TEX L. REV. 71 (1980); Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989).
39. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
See generally, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National
League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. Rav. 1623 (1994).
40. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 458 (1959); accord, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,
210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
41 See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's
"Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1447, 1461 (1995) (noting that the Court's "activist record" that Term
gave the dormant Commerce Clause as an "implicit constitutional provision
greater bite... than any of the provisions (including the individual rights
provisions) explicitly set forth in the Constitution).
42. In October Term 1993, the Court rejected dormant Commerce Clause
claims in two cases. One of them, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
512 U.S. 298 (1994), will be discussed shortly. In the other case, Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994), the Court rested its rejection
of the dormant Commerce Clause claim at issue, see id. at 373-74, entirely
upon a previous case involving similar airport taxes, see Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
43. 511 U.S. 641 (1994).
44. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
45. See Lohman, 511 U.S. at 649-50; Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at
99; cf City of Philadephia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating a
255
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from a comparison with another dormant Commerce Clause
case decided that Term, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board.4 6 Barclays overturned a foreign taxpayer's objection to
California's facially nondiscriminatory tax-accounting system.
Although California's worldwide combined reporting scheme
was inconsistent with the federal government's method for
taxing foreign source income and exposed some taxpayers to
multiple taxation, the Court was willing to tolerate both of
these alleged shortcomings. 7  By contrast, the states in
Lohman and Oregon Waste Systems subjected out-of-state tax-
payers to facially discriminatory taxes. The Court held that
these states had failed to justify the discrimination by reference to
special burdens imposed uniquely by out-of-staters or by inter-
state commerce.48 Read together, Lohman, Oregon Waste Sys-
tems, and Barclays stand for three unexceptional principles.
First, states bear the burden of justifying facial discrimination
against out-of-staters. Second, taxpayers bear the burden of
proving that a facially neutral law cripples interstate com-
merce. Third, these burdens are quite difficult in practice to
discharge. Such are the basic ground rules for reconciling local
public finance with constitutional protection of interstate and
international commerce.4 9
But the Court in 1994 handed down two landmark decisions
on state-law subsidies that were more or less transparently
designed to aid local businesses. The Court was far too modest
in describing C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown0 as "a
small new chapter in [the] course of [its] decisions" on "waste
transfer and treatment" and a routine application of "well-
settled principles of [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence.""'
"virtually per se rule" invalidating statutes that facially discriminate against
interstate commerce); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848, 854 (1996)
(same).
46. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
47. See id. at 312-14 (finding that the state did not impose inordinate
compliance burdens on foreign taxpayers).
48. See Lohman, 511 U.S. at 648-49; Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at
103-04.
49. For the factors that the Court considers when reviewing taxes that
affect foreign commerce, see Barclays, 512 U.S. at 311, 317, 320; Itel Contain-
ers Intl Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 72 (1993); Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185-89 (1983); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1979).
50. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
51. Id. at 386. For waste disposal cases predating Carbone, see Oregon
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504
[Vol. 82:249256
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In Carbone, a New York town sought to finance a $1,400,000
solid waste transfer station by guaranteeing a five-year flow of
garbage-and profits-to a local private contractor. 2 The town
adopted an ordinance directing all nonhazardous solid waste to
this transfer station. "[A]s the most candid of amici and even
Clarkstown [itself] admit[ted], the flow control ordinance [was]
a financing measure."" Three dissenting Justices approved
this use of local police power to "satisfy[] a traditional govern-
mental responsibility" without conferring an undue "benefit on
a class of local private actors." 4 According to them, the ordi-
nance was indeed "a way to finance a public improvement," but
one that lawfully spread costs "among... local generators of
trash."55 A majority of five, however, condemned "the flow con-
trol ordinance [as] just one more instance of local processing
requirements that we long have held invalid,"56 as another pro-
tectionist measure "hoard[ing] a local resource... for the
benefit of local businesses."57 Rarely has the line between the
benign and the benighted divided the Court so sharply.
Even more extraordinary was West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy.58 Alarmed by its loss of market share to dairy farmers
in neighboring states, Massachusetts adopted an emergency
milk pricing order that taxed all wholesalers by volume and,
critically, distributed the impounded funds to Massachusetts
producers. 9 Like a patently unlawful tariff on imported milk,
the Massachusetts pricing order had the "avowed purpose
U.S. 353 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
52. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
53. Id. at 393; cf Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders, 112 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Garbage... carries
substantial value for those with the desire or know-how to dispose of it.").
54. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id; cf. Ben Ohrleins & Sons & Daughters v. Hennepin County, 115
F.3d 1372, 1379-80 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the financial bur-
den of flow control falls partly on waste generators in the form of elevated
tipping fees); Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1387 (8th
Cir. 1993) (same).
56. 511 U.S. at 391.
57. Id. at 392. Justice O'Connor stood alone in condemning Clarkstown's
flow control ordinance, "not because of facial or effective discrimination
against interstate commerce, but rather because it impose[d] an excessive
burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
58. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
59. See id. at 189-91.
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and... undisputed effect [of] enabl[ing] higher cost Massachu-
setts dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in
other States."" The pricing order resembled "a broad-based
tax on a single kind of good," coupled with "special provisions
for in-state producers."61
The Massachusetts pricing order combined two measures:
an across-the-board tax on a commodity (milk), and a direct
subsidy for certain in-staters (dairy farmers). Noting that each
measure, standing alone, is traditionally considered constitu-
tional, the state defended its milk pricing order as a sound
"combination of two independently lawful regulations."62 The
West Lynn Court delivered a crushing response. Recognizing
that the subsidy would transform the mighty dairy lobby from
a potential opponent to a vigorous supporter of the pricing or-
der,63 the Court reasoned that a program "conjoining a tax and
a subsidy" would create a legal monster "more dangerous to in-
terstate commerce than either part alone."64
The Court also unleashed a dictum arguably more signifi-
cant than its holding. Despite assuming for the argument's
sake that a state could draw a subsidy from general revenues,
the Court dropped this bombshell of a footnote:
We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsi-
dies, and we need not do so now. We have, however, noted that
"M[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run
afoul" of the negative Commerce Clause. In addition, it is undisputed
that States may try to attract business by creating an environment
conducive to economic activity, as by maintaining good roads, sound
public education, or low taxes. 6
This footnote, coupled with the further dictum that a "pure
subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local busi-
ness[es],"66 fueled the Minneapolis Manifesto. Burstein and
Rolnick lost faith in a judicial resolution of the "economic war
60. Id. at 194.
61. Id. at 196-97; cf. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988)
(invalidating this sort of law); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,
276 (1984) (same); I.M. Darnel & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U.S. 113,
125 (1908) (same).
62. 512 U.S. at 198.
63. See id. at 200-01 & n.18.
64. Id. at 199-200.
65. Id. at 199 n.15 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
278 (1988)) (other citations omitted).
66. Id. at 199.
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among the states." 7 "ITf the Court were to consider the consti-
tutional[]" question, they wrote, "one would expect it to hold
that subsidies or preferential taxes impose no burden on inter-
state commerce."
68
A close reading of West Lynn arguably supports a different
interpretation. All four Justices outside the majority argued
that the Court had "gratuitously cast[] doubt on the validity of
state subsidies"69 and "call[ed] into question many garden-
variety state laws heretofore permissible. 7 ° One commentator
agreed that West Lynn destabilized the constitutional status of
state-law subsidies.7' It bears remembering, however, that all
nine Justices, merely a month before deciding West Lynn, had
assumed that Clarkstown could have financed the waste trans-
fer station in Carbone by imposing taxes or floating a bond.7
In this light, perhaps the more accurate conclusion is that West
Lynn "bolsters-rather than undermines-the view that state
subsidies 'ordinarily' are constitutional."73
Moreover, the larger history of West Lynn counsels against
too sanguine an expectation that Congress can and will end the
economic war among the states. Eight weeks after the Su-
preme Court struck down Massachusetts' protectionist milk
pricing order, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a pro-
posal to create a Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 74 under
67. Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 5, at 1895.
68. Id. at 1899 (footnote omitted).
69. 512 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. 1i at 209 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Restraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV.
377,443 (1996).
72. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394
(1994) ("[Ihe town may subsidize the facility through general taxes or mu-
nicipal bonds."); id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
("[T]he town could finance the project by imposing taxes, by issuing municipal
bonds, or even by lowering its price for processing to a level competitive with
other waste processing facilities."); id. at 428-29 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(speaking of practical rather than constitutional "limits on any municipality's
ability to incur debt or to finance facilities out of tax revenues"); Atlantic
Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 112 F.3d
652, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1997) (detailing "several alternatives by which [a] State
could ... ensure the financial integrity of [its] local government entities"
without relying on discriminatory flow control laws).
73. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on
State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 840 (1996).
74 See S. REP. No. 103-333 (1994) (accompanying S. 2069, 103d Cong.
(1994)).
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which a regional commission would deliver income support to
dairy farmers throughout New England. Despite objections
that the compact would effectively nullify West Lynn by insu-
lating New England from the fiercely competitive national
dairy market,75 Congress codified the Northeast Interstate
Dairy Compact as part of its 1996 overhaul of federal agricul-
tural legislation. 6 However eager we might be to entrust the
protection of domestic free trade to Congress, "the political
reality... of mercantilism" shoves the responsibility back to
the courts."
By contrast, dormant Commerce Clause cases suggest that
the Supreme Court is more willing than ever to review subsi-
dies with a great sensitivity to real-world consequences. West
Lynn contains a surprisingly trenchant analysis of client poli-
tics: "when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy
to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State's political processes
can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, be-
cause one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby
against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy." 78 But even
if the Justices are all realists now, to a great extent they re-
main formalists still. The academic recognition that tax ex-
penditures are economically equivalent to direct subsidies 79
has yet to disturb the Court's distinction between "direct sub-
sidization of domestic industry" and "discriminatory taxa-
tion."8 Still, the distinction between direct disbursements and
75. See id. at 33-34 (additional views of Sens. Kohl and Thurmond).
76. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-127, § 147, 110 Stat. 888, 919-20 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7256);
see also Announcement of Implementation of the Northeast Interstate Dairy
Compact, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,290 (Aug. 28, 1996) (announcing the authorization
and implementation of the compact by Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman).
77. Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at 1406.
78. 512 U.S. at 200. A similar degree of sophistication arguably underlies
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590
(1997), a 1997 decision invalidating-a discriminatory property tax exemption
for charitable institutions serving primarily in-state residents. Notably, Jus-
tice Stevens wrote both West Lynn and Camps Newfound.
79. See, e.g., Tax Subsidies as a Device for Implementing Government Pol-
icy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 76-106 (1972) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey);
Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NATL TAxJ. 244 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a De-
vice for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Govern-
ment Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
80. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); accord Camps
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discriminatory taxes is not altogether vapid. Something in the
political economy of public finance advises the Court as a rule
to allow governments to "subsidize" favored projects "through
general taxes or municipal bonds," but not to "employ dis-
criminatory regulation" of the "open market.""1
Carbone and West Lynn are harbingers of a robustly na-
tionalistic policy on domestic free trade, given effect through
the dormant Commerce Clause. It is all too fitting that local
protectionism should spark a comprehensive reexamination of
American federalism. Another economic war among the states,
after all, was the impetus for union: "If there was any one ob-
ject riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution,
it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States
free from all invidious and partial restraints."
8 2
The federal presence in 1994's dormant Commerce Clause
cases counterbalances the Court's renewed willingness to
scrutinize congressional statutes under the Commerce Clause.
Although the Court has long taken a divided approach to parallel
questions of federal and state legislative power,83 the contrast
between the Commerce Clause simpliciter and the dormant
Commerce Clause continues to fascinate legal scholars.8 4 In
the popular legal imagination, the two sides of this Commerce
Clause jurisprudence demonstrate the Court's ability to "hold[]
two contradictory beliefs.., simultaneously, and accept[] both
NewfoundlOwatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1606.
81. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 393, 394 (1994);
see also South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98 (1984)
(plurality opinion) ('There are sound reasons for distinguishing between a
State's preferring its own residents in the initial disposition of goods when it
is a market participant and a State's attachment of restrictions on disposi-
tions subsequent to the goods coming to rest in private hands."); West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 211 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (identifying a constitutionally significant "difference between as-
sisting in-state industry through discriminatory taxation and assisting in-
state industry by other means"); cf Enrich, supra note 71, at 442
(distinguishing between tax expenditures as "characteristic exercise[s] of sovereign
power" from "the state's proprietary participation in market transactions").
82. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., con-
curring in the judgment); accord Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct.
at 1595-96.
83. This tradition stretches at least as far back as McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824).
84. See, e.g., Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1460-61, 1463 ("Why
should the Supreme Court be so active in reviewing state incursions on the
federalist bargain, while remaining relatively passive in reviewing national
incursions?").
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of them." 5 Call it doublethink if you will, but the Justices are
merely exercising an instinct that Justice Holmes undoubtedly
would approve:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of
the several States. 6
E pluribus unum, and hallelujah.
B. THE MINNESOTA SCHOOL OF FEDERALISM
The legal legacy of 1994 extends far beyond the Supreme
Court. Quite ironically, it was a regional bank in the decentral-
ized Federal Reserve System87 that has organized this compre-
hensive analysis of business relocation subsidies. The weight of
the legal scholarship, much of it written since 1994,88 is converging
with the economic literature 9 in condemning business handouts.
85. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOuR 215 (1949).
86. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920).
87. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1994) (dividing the country into no fewer
than eight and no more than twelve geographically defined Federal Reserve
Districts); id. § 241 (directing the President to exercise "due regard to a fair
representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial inter-
ests, and geographical divisions of the country" and limiting any Federal Re-
serve District from having more than a single representative on the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System); HENRY PARKER WILLIS, THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: LEGISLATION, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
561-97 (1923) (discussing the considerations that influenced the arrangement
of the Federal Reserve Districts); Ralph Jay Wexler, Note, Federal Control
over the Money Market, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 176 (describing the
"considerable autonomy" of the Federal Reserve Banks within "a decentral-
ized system").
88. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, On Tariffs v. Subsidies in Inter-
state Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127 (1996);
Enrich, supra note 71; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73; Kathryn L.
Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS.
171 (1997); Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 101 (1995); Michael H. LaFave, Note, Taking Back the Giveaways: Minne-
sota's Corporate Welfare Legislation and the Search for Accountability, 80
MINN. L. REV. 1579 (1996); Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit Indus-
trial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV. 669 (1994).
89. See, e.g., Dan A. Black & William H. Hoyt, Bidding for Firms, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 1249 (1989); Joseph M. Phillips & Ernest P. Goss, The Effect of
State and Local Taxes on Economic Development: A Meta-Analysis, 62 S.
ECON. J. 320 (1995). But see Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic
Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?,
35 J. PuB. ECON. 333 (1988) (concluding that economic competition across
state lines is, on balance, healthy); Thomas J. Holmes, The Effects of Tax Dis-
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This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court has consis-
tently heeded pragmatic advice. If anything, the reverse is
true. Heretofore its federalism cases have been strewn with
useless abstractions and unsupported assertions. Justices of
all persuasions have launched inflammatory rhetoric, with no
evident ability to persuade. Just as the celebrants of localism
draw cold comfort from the mantra that states may protect
themselves through the "national political process,"90 defenders
of national supremacy dismiss the dogma that "a healthy bal-
ance of power between the States and the Federal Government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front,"
such that "the promise of liberty" lies "[i]n the tension between
federal and state power."91 The combatants in this sterile de-
bate "have worn deep grooves repeating the same basic argu-
ments and counter arguments over and over."92 If we are stuck
with a literature that says so "[1little on how federalism really
works,"93 the Justices are partly to blame.
Economic analysis of federalism has often drawn disdain
from a Court that often retorts that "a law can be both eco-
nomic folly and constitutional."94 The Court's willful economic
blindness is especially evident when it restrains Congress's
commerce power. Thus United States v. Lopez voided a federal
gun ban whose connection to interstate commerce was not
visible to the naked judicial eye.95 Justice Thomas went so far
as to try to confine the meaning of "commerce" to the narrow,
eighteenth century sense of "trade."96 Similarly, Chief Justice
crimination When Local Governments Compete for a Tax Base (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
90. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985);
accord South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
91. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991); accord, e.g., United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the federalism envisioned in the original Consti-
tution gave "our citizens... two political capacities, one state and one federal,
each protected from incursion by the other").
92. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the 'Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 147, 159 (1994).
93. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1490 (1994).
94. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); cf Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
731 (1963) (consigning arguments over the "social utility" of contested lines of
business "to the legislature, not to us").
95. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
96. See id. at 585-87 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
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Rehnquist has categorically denied the usefulness of public
choice theory: "Analysis of interest group participation in the
political process may serve many useful purposes, but serving
as a basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is
not one of them."97 As Justice O'Connor announced recently
while exhuming the Tenth Amendment, the drive to reassert
the constitutional role of the states "would be the same even if
one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to any-
one."
98
On the hundredth anniversary of his renowned speech at
Boston University,99 a symposium dedicated to economic analy-
sis of constitutional law might more profitably invoke the Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes of The Path of the Law than the Holmes of
Lochner v. New York.100 A full century after Holmes grudgingly
conceded the temporary ascendancy of "the black-letter man"
in "the rational study of the law," the tempests of legal realism,
legal process, and critical legal studies permit us to salute
Holmes's scholar "of the future": the student "of statistics and
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 884-916 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(marshaling historical evidence in favor of an expanded role for state law in
defining the qualifications of members of Congress).
97. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 215 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); accord id. at 212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Compare id. at 215 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
there were "still at least two strong interest groups opposed to the milk or-
ders-consumers and milk dealers") with Block v. Community Nutrition Inst.,
467 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1984) (denying consumers standing to challenge federal
milk orders).
98. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992); cf. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("[Tlhe Framers ranked other values higher
than efficiency.").
99. See generally Symposium, The Path of the Law After One Hundred
Years, 110 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1997). See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE CRIsIs OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 142 (1992) (arguing that The Path of the Law "pushed American
legal thought into the twentieth century").
100. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics."); accord, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383, 424-25 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (extending Justice Holmes's dictum
about the fourteenth amendment to the Commerce Clause); cf. Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 357 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (hinting
that aggressive judicial review under the dormant Commerce Clause is the
functional equivalent of substantive due process); Southern Pac. Co. v. Ari-
zona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 & n.4 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 796
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (same). But see Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at
1406 ("Free trade is a more tractable judicial goal than the typical Lochnerian
standards of rationality or economic efficiency.... ").
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the master of economics." 10 The Supreme Court has yet to fall
irredeemably into the formalist pit; its most recent dormant
Commerce Clause decision recognizes practical insights devel-
oped in the scholarship on local developmental subsidies. 10 2
Indeed, if there is any branch of constitutional law that em-
phasizes economic substance over legal form, it is the dormant
Commerce Clause.10 3
The Court nevertheless displays a pronounced and oft-
repeated disdain for economic analysis. Perhaps the advocates
of a more realistic approach should turn the rhetoric of rabid
federalism on its head. We in the provinces can tolerate only so
much hot air from imperial Washington, and any further paeans
to the virtues of regulatory entropy had better be backed with
concrete facts and figures. Enough with fairy tale federalism;
put up proof that it does us some good, any good, or shut up.
Blind loyalty to "Our Federalism"?1°4 Good-bye to all that.105
At the risk of engaging in some unseemly boosterism, I
suggest that Minnesota offers an ideal venue for an economi-
cally informed study of federalism. Not only is Minnesota
home to the Federal Reserve Bank that started this furor; it is
home to the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Constitutional
Commentary, and a storied tradition of analyzing constitu-
tional law through practical reason rather than formal logic.
Minnesota is home also to a burgeoning literature "on issues
concerning economic regulation within federal systems." 0 6
Daniel Farber and Robert Hudec have compared the dormant
Commerce Clause with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.'0 7 Fred Morrison has offered an American perspective on
101. Oliver Windell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1001 (1997).
102. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct.
1590, 1606 (1997) (citing Enrich, supra note 71, at 442-43; Hellerstein & Coe-
nen, supra, 73 at 846-48).
103. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977) (stressing "not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its
practical effect" in Commerce Clause challenges to state and local taxes); accord
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 295 (1987).
104. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); cf Printz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365, 2377 n.ll (1997) ("The fact is that our federalism is not
Europe's.").
105. ROBERT GRAVES, GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT (1929).
106. Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic
Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1330 n.82 (1995).
107. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 24. Most recently Professor Hudec
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federalism in settings international.'018 Daniel Gifford has syn-
thesized American trade law, American and international anti-
trust law, and the dormant Commerce Clause. 10 9 Recognizing
that American federalism is "triadic," comprising not only the
states but also Indian tribes, Philip Frickey has singularly
"domesticated" federal Indian law in the broader contexts of in-
ternational law and American constitutional law.'10
Such are the intellectual riches that feed this Symposium.
The Minnesota Law Review stands ready to reap the Minneapolis
Manifesto's newest academic harvest. Welcome to the Minne-
sota School of Federalism, where the economics is strong, the
pragmatism is contagious, and all the ideas are above average."'
has coedited (with economist Jagdish Bhagwati) a two-volume compilation
called FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
108. See Fred L. Morrison & Riidiger Wolfrum, The Impact of Federalism
on the Implementation of International Trade Obligations, in NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAW 519 (Meinhard Hilf &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993).
109. See Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and Its Intellectual Milieu, 37
ANTITRUST BULL. 333, 348-53, 359-65 (1997); Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and
Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences, and Relationships, 44 DEPAUL L. REv.
1049 (1995); Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause,
and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy,
44 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1995); Daniel J. Gifford, Rethinking the Relationship Be-
tween Antidumping and Antitrust Laws, 6 AM. U.J. IN' L. & POL'Y 277(1991); Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at
Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1997).
110. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 31, 31 (1996). For other examples of Professor Frickey's extensive work
in federal Indian law, see Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents:
Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754
(1997); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Consti-
tutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381(1993); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990); Philip P.
Frickey, Content and Legitimacy in Federal Indian Law, 94 MICH. L. REv.
1973 (1996) (book review); cf Philip P. Frickey, Lawnet: The Case of the(Missing) Tenth Amendment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 755 (1991) (spoofing the law of
federalism in a context not involving Indian law). Professor Frickey also
played a prominent role in organizing the two conferences inspired by the
Minneapolis Manifesto. See Philip P. Frickey, The Congressional Process and
the Constitutionality of Federal Legislation to End the Economic War among
the States, THE REGION, June 1996, at 58.
111. Cf. GARRISON KEILLOR, LEAVING HOME xvii (1987) (describing the
author's fictional hometown, Lake Wobegon, as a place "where all the women
are strong, the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average").
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Ill. OUR FEDERALISM, OURSELVES
In an era when Darwinian ecology touches intellectual
realms as seemingly remote as cosmology,112 we might extract
an organizing metaphor for this Symposium from the biological
world. Federalism serves as an adaptive legal response to natural
conditions. More precisely, governments adopt federalism orjoin federations in order to survive or thrive in a world shaped
by unevenly distributed factor endowments."1 Within every
federation, each constituent state struggles to maximize its
gains while contributing as little as possible to the central
authority.' Conversely, the central authority has every in-
centive to aggrandize itself at the expense of the constituent
states. From each actor's point of view, cooperation is a neces-
sary evil, an expensive burden to be avoided."' Federalism, in
short, is the legal analogue of symbiosis. As it was when bene-
ficial parasites invaded ancient prokaryotes (simple single-
celled organisms such as bacteria) and thus sparked the evo-
lution of eukaryotes (complex multicelled organisms such as
humans),"6 laws and legal institutions emerge from cooperation,
defection, and other symbiotic processes. 117
In law as in biology, a[t]he way a question is asked limits and
disposes the ways in which any answer to it-right or wrong-
may be given.""' Although a molecular biologist, a geneticist,
112. See LEE SMOLIN, THE LIFE OF THE CosMos (1997); cf John 0.
McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 251 (1996) (comparing constitutional origins with humanity's biological
origins). On a Darwinian approach to the social sciences, see generally THE
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF
CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992); CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH
OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIvAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN
SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991).
113. Cf Friedman, supra note 13, at 1448-53 (describing how economic and
technological change motivates efforts to harmonize local laws on a national
or international basis).
114 See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1449, 1470-76; Barry Weingast
& Rui de Figueiredo, Self-Enforcing Federalism: Solving the Two Fundamen-
tal Dilemmas (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
115. See Jenna Bednar, Federalisms: Unstable by Design (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
116. See LYNN MARGULIS, SYMBIOSIS IN CELL EVOLUTION: LIFE AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT ON THE EARLY EARTH 2-14 (1981).
117. See David Sloan Wilson & Elliot Sober, Reintroducing Group Selection
to the Human Behavior Sciences, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 585 (1994).
118. SUZANNE K LANGER, PHILOSPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE
SYMBOLISM OF REASON, RITE, AND ART 3 (3d ed. 1957).
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and an ecologist might ask different questions about a single
biological phenomenon, all three might "be 'right' on different
levels."119 So might we approach the articles in this Sympo-
sium-as distinct yet interrelated queries into the pathology of
the law.
In Valuing Federalism,120 Barry Friedman argues that the
Supreme Court systematically undervalues federalism. 121 De-
spite the revival of serious Commerce Clause scrutiny in
United States v. Lopez, 122 Professor Friedman contends that the
Court's chronic failure to develop a coherent theory of federal-
ism has unduly expanded Congress's implied powers1 23 and, in
the context of conditional federal spending, betrayed the very
notion of enumerated powers. 124 Preemption and the dormant
Commerce Clause, Professor Friedman argues, have enabled
Congress and the federal judiciary to displace large bodies of
state law. 125 He attributes these "centripetal forces" to factors
ranging from the states' sorry civil rights record to flourishing
interstate trade and technological evolution. 126 Indeed, one of
the New Deal's legal veterans marveled a generation ago at the
"ease with which the public and the judiciary now swallow the
federal regulation of what were once deemed exclusively local
matters."
127
In response to the devaluing of federalism, Professor Fried-
man defends state authority as the best guarantor of public par-
ticipation, accountable government, political experimentation,
and cultural diversity.128 He nevertheless acknowledges the value
of national government in providing public goods, combatting
interstate externalities and the "race to the bottom," and es-
tablishing uniform standards for interstate and international
119. MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
NATURE 42 (1993).
120. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997)
121. See id. At 317, 335-37.
122. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
123. Friedman, supra note 120, at 338-40 (discussing, inter alia, McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
124. See id. at 340-42 (discussing, inter alia, South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987)).
125. See id. at 342-60.
126. See id. at 365-78.
127. Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization
of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 284 (1973).
128. See Friedman, supra note 120, at 386-405.
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trade. 129  These are the ground rules by which the United
States will establish a third century of federalism.13 ° Professor
Friedman's analysis thus provides the normative framework by
which to assess the four other articles in this Symposium.
Those articles transform the Minneapolis Manifesto's fo-
cused critique of local public finance into a more extensive in-
quiry into public choice and multijurisdictional cooperation.
Whereas Walter Hellerstein and Clayton Gillette revisit the
positive legality and normative desirability of local develop-
ment subsidies, 131 Richard Briffault studies the "subatomic"
units of American government-the municipal and submunicipal
entities that transform local government law into a distinctive
branch of federalism.13 2 Richard Revesz explores the idea of a
race to the bottom among competing states in the realm of en-
vironmental enforcement. 133
This is not to suggest that the central questions of public
finance have been settled. Quite the contrary. The constitu-
tionality of local development incentives remains hotly contested.
In a 1996 article written with Dan Coenen, Professor Heller-
stein "offered an overarching theory of how the Commerce
Clause interacts with both state-tax and state-subsidy incen-
tives."'34 Peter Enrich's contemporaneous study35 agreed "that
there is a substantial class of tax incentives.., which cannot
withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny."136 In this Symposium,
129. See id. at 405-409.
130. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Auton-
omy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)
(compiling the conventional arguments in favor of state independence within a
federal system).
13L Compare Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State
Tax Incentives, 82 MINN. L. REv. 413 (1997) with Clayton P. Gillette, Business
Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 447 (1997).
132. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Gov-
ernance, 82 MINN. L. REv. 503 (1997).
133. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environ-
mental Regulation:A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997).
134. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 870.
135. See Enrich, supra note 71. Compare id. at 408 n.159 (acknowledging
the simultaneous drafting and completion of Hellerstein and Coenen's article)
with Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 871 n.444 (acknowledging the
simultaneous drafting and completion of Enrich's article).
136. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 871 n.444; cf. Enrich, supra
note 71, at 440 n.344 (noting that the two "class[es] of incentives" condemned
by Enrich are "more or less coterminous with the class[es] that Hellerstein
and Coenen [identify as] unconstitutional in their... article").
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Professor Gillette argues to the contrary "that the feared scope
and consequences" of a putative war between the states "may be
overblown," "the benefits of such competition may be under-
stated," and "the proposed remedy-federal intervention-
imposes additional costs." 137
But Professors Hellerstein, Coenen, Enrich, and Gillette
have reached a consensus on other matters. All four agree that a
flat rule against state-law subsidies would sweep too broadly. 138
Everyone agrees that "[tlo say that subsidies are ordinarily con-
stitutional is not to say that they are always so," 39 much less to
say when subsidies should be distributed. The real difference
lies in dividing the constitutional from the condemned. At the
risk of oversimplifying nuanced arguments, one can describe
each competing viewpoint according to its controlling principle.
Whereas Professor Enrich would strike down measures that
cause excessive "economic distortion,"4 ° Professors Hellerstein
and Coenen stress the "coercive" nature of unconstitutional
schemes."' Echoing Richard Collins's reminder that economic
union is worth protecting by constitutional means,142 Professor
Gillette asks whether a challenged tax or subsidy would reduce
the social welfare of the United States.143 All four combatants
rightfully recognize that the market-participant exception sheds
singularly important light on the question of business incen-
137. Gillette, supra note 131, at 447-48.
138. See Enrich, supra note 71, at 446-47, 458-63 (noting that only
"explicitly discriminatory" state incentives will trigger Commerce Clause
scrutiny); Gillette, supra note 131, at 450 ("[It cannot be that the Commerce
Clause seeks to prohibit all forms of interstate competition."); Hellerstein, supra
note 131 , at 424 ("[A]ll state tax incentives cannot really be unconstitu-
tional."); Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 870 ("State business incen-
tives will neither stand nor fall en masse under our analysis.").
139. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 848; cf. Chris Farrell, The
Economic War Among the States: An Overview, THE REGION, June 1996, at 4,
7 ("[Tlhere is an enormous range for action between an outright federal ban
and checkbook competition.").
140. See Enrich, supra note 71, at 453-58.
141. See Hellerstein, supra note 131, at 424-31; Hellerstein & Coenen, su-
pra note 73, at 806-13.
142. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988).
143. See Gillette, supra note 131, at 492.
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rives." Finally, all four share a commitment to existing case
law, to upholding precedent rather than plotting revolution. 45
These articles merit comparison with another recent piece by
Professor Gillette. State-law business incentives are actually the
mirror image of another phenomenon involving the interaction
of government and the private economy. When citizens "opt
out" of public schooling, police protection, or mail delivery, pri-
vate entities enter markets previously controlled by public
authorities. 146 Conversely, a state-law business incentive sup-
plements the private stream of revenue that ordinarily deter-
mines expansion or relocation decisions. Each instance of opting
out demonstrates that even putatively public goods can be produced
without governmental involvement,147 and every developmental
subsidy rests on the promise of positive externalities. What Pro-
fessor Gillette has said of "opting out" therefore applies with
equal force here: We should eschew "a single-minded embrace"
of any solution to federalism's myriad problems, for a simple
matrix comparing economic effects with political costs will not
"weigh properly all the [relevant] variables."148
Professor Briffault's introspective look at sublocal govern-
ments stands in stark contrast with Professor Friedman's la-
ment over "centripetal tendencies" in American public law.1 49
In Professor Briffault's survey, American cities are leading a
countervailing, centrifugal trend. 5 ° Because city borders de-
termine the constituency and tax base for any locally financed
project, 5 ' the demarcation of municipal governments within
any state represents another form of "Our Federalism. 52 In-
144. See Enrich, supra note 71, at 441-43; Gillette, supra note 131, at 492-
93; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 845-46 (describing the Court's at-
titude towards the market-participant exception).
145. See Enrich, supra note 71, at 424; Gillette, supra note 131, at 495;
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 73, at 870.
146. See Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1996); cf Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and
Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 456-62 (1988) (exploring instances in which the
private sector displaces publicly supplied goods or services altogether).
147. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcON.
357 (1974).
148. Gillette, supra note 146, at 1219.
149. See Friedman, supra note 120, at 365-78.
150. See Briffault, supra note 132, at 508.
151 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1128-32 (1996).
152. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism:
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deed, local government law is an arguably more significant
manifestation of federalism, even if American constitutional
law insists on treating subdivisions as legally insignificant
"convenient agencies" of state government.'53 To the extent
that "decentralization in a single city" offers citizens more
"realistic choices among government service packages" than
does decentralization at the state level,' 54 sublocal devolution
of power matters more than traditional federalism. Enterprise
zones often promise extensive regulatory relief but usually rely
on modest subsidies, tax breaks, and other standard forms of
target public assistance. 155  Tax increment financing-the
practice of freezing property valuations in a putatively depressed
neighborhood-has become a leading method of preferential
taxation.'56 By contrast, special zoning districts seek to steer
or limit development according to the "singular characteristics"
of a favored group such as artists or clothing designers.157 Fi-
nally, by combining elements of enterprise zones and special
zoning districts, business improvement districts facilitate the
finance and delivery of public services such as sanitation or se-
curity within a neighborhood.'58
The proliferation of sublocal structures warrants substantial
modifications in Charles Tiebout's "pure theory of local expen-
ditures,"159 for four decades the dominant economic model of local
government law.6 ° According to Tiebout, cities compete for
residents and revenues by offering different packages of taxes
and services, and rational "consumer-voters" respond by moving.161
Tiebout's model assumes a large number of small localities and
Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990).
153. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); accord Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); see also United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984); City of Trenton v.
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923).
154. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a Na-
tional Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 919 (1994) (citing ERIC A-
NORDLINGER, DECENTRALIZING THE CITY: A STUDY OF BosToN's LITTLE CITY
HALLS (1972)).
155. See Briffault, supra note 132, at 509-12.
156. See id. at 512-14.
157. See id. at 514-17.
158. See id. at 517-21.
159. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956).
160. For merely one example reflecting Tiebouts influence on legal scholarship
concerning federalism, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders'Design, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987) (book review).
161. See Tiebout, supra note 159, at 419.
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a completely informed, mobile population 162-in other words,
the characteristics of perfectly competitive markets. In prac-
tice, perfectly competitive markets, whether for goods or for
residents, do not exist.16 Unlike the economies of scale that
make large firms more formidable contenders in contestable
markets,1" however, heterogeneity and the elevated costs of
taxpayer exit cripple large cities in their competition for resi-
dents. 165 Intracity federalism overcomes these diseconomies of
urban scale. According to Professor Briffault, sublocal divisions
help big cities compete with their smaller counterparts and may
even lead to intracity competition among sublocal divisions.166
Professor Revesz's survey of regulatory rationales in envi-
ronmental law transports* this Symposium in the opposite di-
rection. When seen as the link between the primary rationales
for multijurisdictional environmental cooperation, federalism
loses its character as a uniquely American institution. A dump
is a dump is a dump. As Professor Revesz has recognized
elsewhere,16 the behavior of the states under the domestic
Clean Air Act 168 can be compared with the behavior of member-
states of the European Union or that of signatory states under
the Montreal Protocol. 169 In this Symposium, Professor Revesz
162. See id. (assuming that "[clonsumer-voters are fully mobile" and "have
full knowledge of differences among [cities] revenues and expenditure pat-
terns" and that "[there are a large number of communities in which the con-
sumer-voters may choose to live").
163. See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 149-76 (1979); Robert P.
Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Federalist Fiscal Constitution for an Imper-
fect World: Lessons from the United States, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN
HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 79, 79 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1988).
164. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the
Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 121 (1984).
165. Briffault, supra note 132, at 506-07.
166. See id. at 526-28.
167. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Normative Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED?
97 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997).
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). See generally John P. Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995).
169. See United Nations: Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989).
See generally Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism
in the United States and the European Union, 54 MD. L. REV. 1658 (1995); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison
of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587 (1994); Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Law in the United States and the European Commu-
nity: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41.
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focuses on two of the principal rationales for centralizing envi-
ronmental law:170 the "race to the bottom" that occurs as
smaller jurisdictions relax environmental standards in an effort to
attract businesses 17' and the problem of interstate externalities. 172
Professor Revesz argues that the radically underinclusive "race
to the bottom" rationale cannot justify a centralized approach
to environmental protection. Consistent with the prevailing
criticism of this argument in the international trade litera-
ture, 173 he shows that any advantage conferred by lowered en-
vironmental standards is likely to be offset by numerous other
factors and that the states would compete by other means un-
der a system of centralized environmental enforcement. 74 He
also shows how the Clean Air Act, though plausibly defended as a
shield against each state's tendency to export environmental
damage, has actually given the states perverse incentives to
externalize ecological harm.17 5
Professor Revesz's criticism of the race to the bottom and
interstate externality rationales reverberates far beyond the
environmental area. As Daniel Farber has shown, the conditions
thought to support centralized environmental protection are
structurally similar to the rationales underlying free trade
law. 76 Armed with this insight, we can easily reinterpret Pro-
170. See Revesz, supra note 133.
171. See also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regu-
lation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that interstate competition
produces more favorable results than federal environmental standards); cf.
Peter B. Pashigan, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being
Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551 (1985) (describing how different regions
within the United States compete on an environmental basis in order to
achieve a comparative economic advantage).
172. See also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996).
173. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental
Standards: The Level-Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1,
28 (1996) (concluding that "[t~he size of the commercial advantage" attained
by "countries with weak environmental standards" "is usually too small to
generate serious business concerns"); cf John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules
and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1227 (1992) (attributing much of the fear of environmental degradation in a
free trade regime to cultural differences between advocates of environmental
protection and advocates of free trade).
174. See Revesz, supra note 133, passim.
175. See id. at 541.
176. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Econ-
omy, 83 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); cf Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the
Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REv.
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fessor Revesz's criticism of federal environmental law as an
implicit rejection of the Minneapolis Manifesto. Indeed, Profes-
sor Revesz questions outright "why one ought to reject across-
the-board a model of a competitive market in location rights."117
If there is no polluter's race to the bottom, there is likewise no
basis for demanding a federal resolution, judicial or legislative,
of the arms race in local business incentives.
Yet the Minneapolis Manifesto is far from lost. Its most
practical question remains unanswered: Why do the proponents
of sports subsidies so consistently win (as do the supporters of
most other local business incentives)? "If you build it," say the
boosters, "they will come."' But many a city will strike out in
the sports subsidy derby. There will be no joy in Mudville. More
than baseball itself in the jaded eyes of its bored detractors, the
quest for business development subsidies "is a game with in-
creasingly heightened anticipation of increasingly limited ac-
tion."179 When the number of medium-sized to large Amercian
cities exceeds the number of major league sports franchises, why
do so many cities, in the fashion of a profligate Kubla Khan, "a
splendid pleasure-dome decree? i80 What sort of farm team fed-
eralism have we achieved, in which every city scrambles desper-
ately to avoid minor-league status?
A complete response requires attention to special-interest
politics within federal systems. Professor Revesz notes that public
choice concerns might justify federal environmental law, but he
does not comprehensively assess this regulatory rationale."8' The
key therefore lies in what this Symposium does not say. "Thirty
spokes join at the hub: their use for the cart is where they are
not."'82 The real answer to the Manifesto's unanswered question
"lies in the politics, not the economics, of location incentives."8 3 To
explain how the political economy of the special-interest state af-
1247, 1273 (1996) (seeking an approach to international environmental and
economic law that "somehow give[s] credence to [the] sets of values" repre-
sented by the competing, "fundamentally incomplete" visions of "[gilobalism
and localism").
177. Revesz, supra note 133, at 563.
178. Watch FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 1989).
179. JOHN IRVING, A PRAYER FOR OWEN MEANY 31 (1989).
180. SAMUEL T. COLERmGE, KUBLAKHAN, line 2 (1816).
181. See Revesz, supra note 133, at [ms 104, 108].
182. Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching, in Ti ESSENTIAL TAO 14 (Thomas Cleary
trans., Harper Collins 1991).
183. Enrich, supra note 71, at 393.
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fects the law of interjurisdictional cooperation, I will revisit a cru-
cial but forgotten footnote in the annals of American federalism.
IV. FILBURN'S FORGOTTEN FOOTNOTE
A. THE POWER OF MYTH
His name was farmer Filburn, we looked in on his wheat sales.
We caught him exceeding his quota. A criminal hard as nails.
He said, "I don't sell none interstate."
I said, "That don't mean cow flop.
We think you're affecting commerce."
And I set fire to his crop, HOT DAMN!
Cause we got interstate commerce
Ain't no where to run!
We gone regulate you
That's how we have fun. 184
If indeed the framers of the American Constitution "split
the atom of sovereignty,"185 then the Justices of the New Deal
era sustained federalism's first chain reaction.18 6 In 1942, the
year in which Enrico Fermi harnessed atomic fission, the Su-
preme Court decided Wickard v. Filburn.187 This decision has
since become deeply embedded in America's constitutional
canon. 8' Like most other canonical works, Filburn has as-
sumed both historical and mythical dimensions, and it be-
hooves us to distinguish the two. 189 Only after isolating Fil-
184. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 674 (1995)
(setting these lyrics to the tune of "Convoy").
185. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[F]ederalism was the unique contribution of
the Framers to political science and political theory.").
186. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1918) (upholding an ex-
pansive view of the federal treaty power in spite of "invisible radiation" ema-
nating from the tenth amendment).
187. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
188. See generally Is THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL CANON? (Sanford Levinson
& J.M. Balkin eds., forthcoming 1997).
189. Cf. JAMES BARR, THE SCOPE AND AUTHORITY OF THE BMLE 1-17 (1980)
(distinguishing the historical portions of the Bible from passages that more
properly belong to the realm of "myth and legend"); Philip P. Frickey, Faithful
Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1092-93 (1995) (identifying similarities
and differences among religious, literary, and legal interpretation).
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burn's mythical elements can we properly appreciate its his-
torical significance. 90
Filburn, so its myth goes, represented the high-water
mark of the New Deal's constitutional revolution. From the
very beginning, Filburn has awed defenders of state sover-
eignty. The meekest commentators demurred that the decision
rested "primarily upon a rather extended concept of competition."191
More audacious critics expressed "wonder as to the limits of
[Congress's] tremendous and constantly growing power" to
regulate interstate commerce. 192 A half-century later, the myth
of Filburn reached full flower. United States v. Lopez 93 de-
scribed Filburn as "perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity."194 So
much for Filburn's own observation that "Chief Justice Mar-
shall described the federal commerce power with a breadth
never yet exceeded."' 95 In our day, Garcia1 96 may represent the
jurisprudential nadir for the states,197 but Filburn still rates as
one of the most significant points on the downward arc that be-
gan with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.198
Law can turn even outrageous myth into history through a
sufficiently persistent pattern of citations. This path from
190. Cf KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD: THE 4,000-YEAR QUEST
OF JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 211 (1993) (tracing the English words
myth, mysticism, and mystery to the same Greek root and describing all three
words as "rooted in an experience of darkness and silence").
191. Note, The Supreme Court of the United States During the October
Term, 1942 (pt. 1), 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 837, 845 (1943).
192. John J. Trenam, Note, Commerce Power Since the Schechter Case, 31
GEO. L.J. 201,202 (1946).
193. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
194. Id. at 560.
195. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 120 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 194-95 (1824)).
196. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
197. See Kramer, supra note 93, at 1486 (observing that Garcia advises
judges to do very little to allocate power between states and federal govern-
ment); William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1709, 1721 (1985).
198. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 ("Jones & Laughlin Steel,
Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that
Clause."); Earl M. Maltz, The Impact of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937
on the Dormant Commerce Clause-A Case Study in the Decline of State
Autonomy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 121, 129 (1995) ("In the wake of Jones
& Laughlin and Wickard, it has become clear that... Congress has authority
to regulate virtually all private economic activity.").
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dogma to doctrine has transfigured Filburn into a major consti-
tutional decision. Filburn stands for the proposition that
"substantial economic effect[s]"199 outweigh facile judicial distinc-
tions between the "direct" and the "indirect" in Commerce
Clause cases.2 °0 Critically, the case has added the "aggregation"
maneuver to constitutional law's argumentative arsenal. Fl-
burn lets Congress reach any economic actor "trivial by itself' as
long as his or her "contribution" to the national economy, "taken
together with that of many other[]" actors "similarly situated,
is far from trivial."2 1 Filburn's aggressive stand against willful
judicial ignorance of actions trivial in themselves influences
even dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the "practical effect"
of a state law "must be evaluated not only by considering the
consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how
the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regula-
tory regimes of the other States and what effect would arise if
not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation."20 2
In an age when the Tenth Amendment has been promoted
from a "truism"20 3 to a serious statutory and constitutional
199. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 125.
200. Id. at 120 ("[Questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided
by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomencla-
ture such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the ac-
tual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce."); id. at 125
(noting that even local, noncommercial activity "may still, whatever its nature,
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'"); accord Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 556; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 536 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
196 n.27 (1968).
201. 317 U.S. at 127-28; accord Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556; Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 275 (1964).
202. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); accord Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 453-54 (1992); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clark-
stown, 511 U.S. 883, 406 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); cf.
Maltz, supra note 198, at 129-30 (bemoaning Filburn's contribution to the
erosion of the Supreme Court's respect for state autonomy and deference to
state legislative judgments in its dormant Commerce Clause cases).
203. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."); cf.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.)
(describing the language of the Tenth Amendment as "leaving the question,
whether [a] particular power.., has been delegated to the one government, or
prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the [Constitution
as a] whole instrument").
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player,2° these legal truths are no longer held to be self-
evident. Among Filburn's detractors, Richard Epstein minces
no words; in his mind, "[tlhe decision cannot pass the 'giggle
test.'" 2°5 For advocates of decentralized government, Wickard
v. Filburn is at best an immolation of the framers' federalism,
at worst the paradigmatic instance of the toothless Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that prevailed between Jones & Laughlin
and Lopez. In radical federalism's jihad, Filburn is the great
Satan.
"Every holy war needs a few heretics, and this one is no
exception."20 6 Only an agriculturally illiterate society could be
bedazzled into believing the myth of Wickard v. Filburn.20 7 By
its own terms, Filburn was not a landmark case. The three-
judge district court that heard the case failed even to mention
the Commerce Clause.208 The Supreme Court intimated that
Filburn's Commerce Clause question "would merit little con-
sideration in light of United States v. Darby."2 9 One of the
New Deal's front-line legal warriors agreed: "Wickard v. Fil-
burn adds little to the Darby case insofar as the pronounce-
ment of affirmative guiding principles is concerned."210 Darby
and the cases it spawned21 had all but gutted Schechter Poultry
and Carter Coal's shaky distinction between commerce and manu-
204. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
205. Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 173 (1996).
206. Jim Chen, Titanic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 535, 542
(1996).
207. On agricultural illiteracy, see generally Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture
Without Farmers? Is Industrialization Restructuring American Food Produc-
tion and Threatening the Future of Sustainable Agriculture?, 14 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 613, 619 (1994), which documents the "gulf between our apparent con-
cerns for health and our understanding of the scientific and economic proc-
esses of agriculture."
208. See Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio), rev'd sub nom.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
209. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 118 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941)).
210. Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946 (pt. 2), 59 HARV. L. REV. 883, 908 (1946).
21L See Overnight Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942); Kirschbaum
Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,
315 U.S. 110 (1942); Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). All
of these cases were cited inFilburn, 317 U.S. at 118 & n.12.
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facturing, production, agriculture.212 Not even the "aggregation"
argument originated in Filburn; a Term earlier, Darby had al-
ready deployed similar reasoning.213  Filburn followed as a
matter of course.214
In order to understand Filburn's true significance, we must
do the unexpected. Instead of revisiting Filburn's familiar formu-
lations of the commerce power, we must excavate one of Justice
Jackson's more obscure footnotes. Instead of examining the
decision as a constitutional landmark, we must examine Fil-
burn as a relatively perfunctory case in a series of agricultural
controversies. To that task I now turn.
B. AMBER WAVES OF GRAIN
As every law student learns,2 15 "Old Man Filburn'had a
farm, / and losing was his fate."16 By contrast, thanks "to what
can charitably be described as intellectual hostility" in most
law schools "to the study of 'farm' law,"2 17 virtually no Ameri-
can lawyer understands Filburn as an agricultural dispute.
Whatever its proper place in the constitutional canon, Wickard
v. Filburn is probably the Supreme Court's second most famous
agricultural law case, ranking close behind United States v.
212. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935); see also
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14, 16 (1895).
213. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 121 ("A familiar... exercise of power is the
regulation of intrastate transactions which are so commingled with or related
to interstate commerce that all must be regulated if the interstate commerce
is to be effectively controlled."); id. at 123 ("[I]n present day industry, compe-
tition by a small part may affect the whole and... the total effect of the com-
petition of many small producers may be great."); accord Filburn v. Helke, 43
F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (S.D. Ohio) (Allen, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
214. Cf Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 344 U.S.
219, 228 (1948) (arguing that distinctions between "production" and
"manufacturing" on one hand and "commerce" on the other could no longer be
sustained after Filburn).
215. Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("As every school-
child learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty be-
tween the States and the Federal Government."); Frickey, Domesticating Fed-
eral Indian Law, supra 110, at 31-33 (criticizing this view of federalism-and
the Court's abuse of Lord Macaulay's metaphor).
216. Jim Chen, The Constitutional Law Songbook, 11 CoNST. COMMENTARY
263, 265 (1994).
217. Neil D. Hamilton, The Study of Agricultural Law in the United States:
Education, Organization and Practice, 43 ARYx L. REV. 503, 511 (1990).
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Carolene Products Co.;2 1 8 a few notches ahead of The Slaughter-
House Cases,219 Nebbia v. New York, 220 and United States v.
Butler. ' and far, far ahead of Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,2n the
Burger Court's infamous "cow shit case."223 By contrast, no
footnote among the thirty-eight in Filburn rivals the notoriety
of footnote four 4 or even footnote three25 in Carolene Prod-
ucts. This is a shame, for footnote twenty-seven of Wickard v.
Filburn is one spectacular specimen of Supreme Court margi-
nalia. A proper understanding of that footnote, however, re-
quires a brief survey of American agriculture and its regulation
between the World Wars.
Roscoe Filburn incurred a penalty for overplanting the
wheat allotment on his Ohio farm by a two-to-one margin. 6
He unsuccessfully complained, inter alia, that Claude
Wickard's Department of Agriculture could not constitutionally
regulate insofar as the wheat was consumed on the farm and
not thrust into interstate commerce.? 7 The fuller economic
and legal background is less well known, even though the
plight of American farmers during the Great Depression is the
stuff of legend22 Agricultural crisis presaged the 1932 elec-
tion. Already laid prostrate by the boll weevil,229 the South ab-
218. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
219. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
220. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
221. 297 U.S. 1 (1934).
222. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
223. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 419 (1979) (describing how Chief Justice Burger insulted
Justice Brennan by assigning him Sakraida, a dreary "patent dispute over a
water flush system designed to remove cow manure from the floor of dairy
barns").
224. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(reserving a "more searching judicial inquiry" for cases involving "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities").
225. Id. at 150 n.3 (stressing "the great importance to the public health of
butter fat and whole milk"). See generally Aside, Don't Cry over Filled Milk:
The Neglected Footnote Three to Carolene Products, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1553
(1988).
226. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1942).
227. See id. at 118-29.
228. Compare, e.g., JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939)
(describing the westward migration of white Oldes during the Dust Bowl)
with, e.g., TONI MORRISON, JAZZ (1992) (describing the northerly migration of
southern sharecroppers before the Dust Bowl).
229. See 4 U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930, at 12 (1932) ("The boll weevil was
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sorbed several more devastating blows. Foreclosure auctions
on a single day in April 1932 moved one-quarter of Missis-
sippi's land.23 ° The Farmers' Holiday Association organized
and carried out violent demonstrations throughout the Mid-
west.231 For once in American agricultural history, North and
South were united in mutual misery.232 Into the agrarian
chaos strode Franklin D. Roosevelt, the patrician Squire of
Hyde Park.233 But Roosevelt's earliest efforts to deliver price
and income support234 and debt reliei 35 to the farm met consti-
tutional defeat in the Supreme Court.236 The Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1933, touted by the President as "the most
drastic and far-reaching piece of farm legislation proposed in time
of peace"2 37 and decried by opponents as "the worst farm bill ever
written,"2 3 lay in ruins.
By the end of Roosevelt's second term, however, Congress
and a more compliant Court had restored the basic architecture of
the New Deal's agricultural policy. From 1935 to 1938, Con-
probably responsible for more changes in the number of farms, farm acreage,
and farm population [during the 1920s] than all other causes put together.");
Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1261, 1303 (1995); Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified.
Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 397-98 (1997).
230. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, at 23 (1963).
231. See GILBERT C. FITE, AMERIcAN FARMERS: THE NEW MINORITY 53-54
(1981).
232. Cf Chen, supra note 229, at 1316-19 (contrasting the northern and
southern traditions in American agriculture); Paul S. Taylor, Public Policy
and the Shaping of Rural Society, 20 S.D. L. REV. 475,476-80 (1975) (same).
233. See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE TRIUMPH 342-50
(1956) (describing the formation of Roosevelt's agricultural policy during the
1932 campaign over a series of meetings with farm leaders at Hyde Park).
234. See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25,
48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (1994)).
235. See Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 28, 1934, ch.
869, 48 Stat. 1289.
236. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1936) (invalidating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555, 594-98 (1935) (invalidating the Farm Bankruptcy Act).
237. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, New Means to Rescue Agriculture-The Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act, in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 74, 79 (1938); cf. Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural
Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 342-43
(1983) (describing the "instrumental" role played by "the personality of
Franklin D. Roosevelt" in the development of New Deal agricultural policy).
238. Gilbert C. Fite, Farmer Opinion and the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
1933, 48 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 656, 669 (1962) (quoting an editorial pub-
lished in the Philadelphia Public Ledger).
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gress passed four major statutes that reinstated the invalidated
laws in all but name: a new Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy
Act of 1935,9 the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act of 1936,240 the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937,241 and the monumental Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938.242 The soil conservation law evaded judicial review because
"No one could challenge the value" or the constitutionality "of
conservation."24 3 By 1939, the three other statutes had withstood
constitutional challenges.2 ' A decision upholding a tobacco in-
spection statute undoubtedly reinforced the Roosevelt admini-
stration's growing sense of invulnerability in agricultural
regulation.245
Seen against this backdrop, Filburn hardly appears an
agricultural milestone, much less a constitutional one. Pay-
ments for planting "soil-conserving" crops restored most of the
acreage reduction and income support agenda of the invali-
dated Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.6 Mulford v.
Smith247 then upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938,248 and other cases established Congress's power to fix
commodity prices directly.249 United States v. Darby2 50 resolved
239. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792,49 Stat. 942.
240. Act of Feb. 29, 1936, ch. 104, 49 Stat. 1148.
241. Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 601-624, 671-674 (1994)).
242. Act of Feb. 16, 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1994)).
243. Breimyer, supra note 237, at 348; cf. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S.
441, 446-48 (1943) (exempting fertilizer distributed by federal agriculture of-
ficials from a Florida inspection law under the theory of intergovernmental
immunity).
244. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 562-81
(1939) (upholding the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act); Mulford v.
Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-51 (1939) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440,
470 (1937) (upholding the Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1935).
245. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 5-19 (1939) (upholding the Tobacco
Inspection Act, Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 623, 49 Stat. 731).
246. See Fite, supra note 238, at 60; Breimyer, supra note 237, at 348-49 &
n.65; Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from Eco-
nomic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 343 (1995).
247. 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
248. See also Troppy v. LaSara Farmers Gin Co., Inc, 113 F.2d 350, 352
(5th Cir. 1940) (upholding the Act's marketing quotas for cotton).
249. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393-94
(1940); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 571 (1939); cf
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-16 (1936) (declining to rule on
Congress's power to fix coal prices).
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most of the important remaining Commerce Clause issues. To
the extent it relitigated these cases, Filburn seems more
analogous to the contemporaneous and deservedly obscure
Wrightwood Dairy case,251 which forced the Court to revisit the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act when a federal appeals
court "inexplicabl[y]" held "that intrastate milk competing in
the same market with interstate was not subject to the com-
merce power."25
2
What distinguished Wickard v. Filburn was wheat.253 Ah,
"wheat, the king of all grains! 2 54 Earlier decisions on Con-
gress's power to regulate agriculture had involved tobacco 2 5 or
milk.256 Wheat differed in two key respects. First, wheat has a
global reach that neither tobacco nor milk can match.257 One of
merely a dozen or so plant species that dominate the human
diet, wheat is grown widely and shipped even further. 8 The
outbreak of world war magnified the importance of the wheat
market. (As we shall see, though, the real problem in the years
preceding Filburn was a wheat surplus, not a shortage.) Sec-
ond, unlike tobacco, milk, or cotton, wheat is as readily used by
its producer as it is sold to a processor. Because "[flarmers did
not use raw cotton or tobacco themselves," they "brought nearly
all to the tobacco warehouse or the cotton gin for marketing."2 59
As for milk, the dependency of dairy producers on economically
independent "handlers" has driven legal disputes as old as co-
operative marketing and as new as West Lynn.260  A clever
250. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
251. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
252. Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946 (pt. 2), 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 689 (1946).
253. See Stem, supra note 210, at 901.
254. O.E. ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH 110 (Lincoln Colcord & O.E.
R61vaag trans., 1927).
255. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1 (1939).
256. See Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110; United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
257. Cf JIM LONGMIRE & WALTER H. GARDINER, EcoN. RESEARCH SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., LONG TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE IN FEED AND
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS 2 (1984) (reporting that 90% of wheat traded intema-
tionally is used as food).
258. See generally Moshe Feldman et al., Wheats, in EVOLUTION OF CROP
PLANTS 184, 184-92 (J. Smartt & N.W. Simmonds eds., 2d ed. 1995).
259. Stem, supra note 210, at 902.
260. Compare, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939)
(interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act's exemption from the federal antitrust
laws) with, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (holding
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regulator (or monopolist) can target a single bottleneck by which
to command these markets. Wheat's exceptional mobility and
its versatility as a food crop and a feed grain led to a singularly
instructive regulatory conflict.
Proceeding from the grand to the particular, let us look
first at the global market for wheat between the World Wars.
The immediate impetus for Filburn came from the Department
of Agriculture's decision to impose wheat quotas for crop year
1941.261 As the Supreme Court recognized, however, "[t]he
wheat industry ha[d] been a problem industry for some
years."262 The period immediately before World War I, memo-
rialized as the "parity" period in federal agricultural stat-
utes,263 were American farmers' golden years. But the war that
made the world safe for democracy made the land perilous for
agriculture.21 "The initial shock of war in 1914... brought an
overnight collapse in the foreign sales of wheat and cotton
.... 265 Wartime inflation, meanwhile, devastated purchasing
power on the farm.266 Even the substitution of diesel- and gas-
driven mechanical power for horsepower was pinching the
farmer: the systematic replacement of horses with farm ma-
chinery simultaneously raised farm yields, increased farmers'
dependence on purchased inputs, and decreased demand for
feed grains.267 Many American farmers, especially wheat
growers, were caught in a classic price squeeze: 26 depressed
that a state milk pricing order violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
261 See Stem, supra note 210, at 901.
262. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
263. See 7 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1)(e) (1994) (defining the "parity index," as of
any date, as "the ratio of (i) the general level of prices for articles and services
that farmers buy" as of that date "to (ii) the general level of such
prices... during the period January 1910 to December 1914, inclusive"). For
the intellectual origins of the parity principle, see GEORGE N. PEEK & HUGH
S. JOHNSON, EQUALITY FOR AGRICULTURE (1922).
264. See generally BENJAMIN H. HIBBARD, EFFECTS OF THE GREAT WAR
UPON AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 22-67 (1919).
265. THEODORE SALOUTOS, THE AMERICAN FARMER AND THE NEW DEAL 3
(1982).
266. See A.B. Genung, The Purchasing Power of the Farmer's Dollar from
1913 to Date, 117 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 22 (1925).
267. See SALOUTOS, supra note 265, at 6,25.
268. See generally FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976); City of
Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1992);
John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of
Action, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563 (1984).
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demand and prices for their products, coupled with unbearable
increases in the cost of living and production. 69
The macroeconomic and political conditions of the 1920s
and '30s tightened the vise. The forty million acres rushed into
production upon American entry into World War I kept dumping
huge grain harvests out of the Great Plains. Foreign markets
no longer offered a relief valve. Transformed by military victory
from a global debtor into a creditor, the United States became
a nation of importers. The rosy balance of payments made it
extremely difficult to restore American agricultural exports to
pre-war levels, much less to conquer new overseas markets.2 7 1
Political instability in Europe razed several significant export
markets. Crushed by brutal reparation obligations and hyperin-
flation, Germany hiked tariffs and subsidized domestic grain
production.272  Fascist Italy likewise closed its markets and
propped up its growers. 73 Finally, the restructuring of Soviet
agriculture all but barred imports.274
The American response did nothing to interrupt the global
lurch toward awesome tariffs and agricultural autarky. Quite
the opposite. The McNary-Haugen bills that nearly became
law in 1927 and 1928 would have raised a tariff wall against
agricultural imports in order to lift sagging domestic commodity
prices.27 5 Herbert Hoover's election ended the McNary-Haugen
plan, but his administration implemented an even more ag-
269. For an explanation of the "agricultural treadmill," the farm-flavored
variant of the price squeeze, see WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH
AND REALITY 85-107 (1958); WILLARD W. COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 378-95 (1979).
270. See SALOUTOS, supra note 265, at 3.
271. See, e.g., E. G. Nourse, The Trend of Agricultural Exports, 36 J. POL.
ECON. 330 (1928); Rexford G. Tugwell, The Problem of Agriculture, 39 POL.
SCI. Q. 549 (1924).
272. See Leo Pasvolsky, International Relations and Financial Conditions
in Foreign Countries Affecting the Demand for American Agricultural Prod-
ucts, 14 J. FARM. ECON. 257, 260-62 (1932).
273. See id. at 262-63; N.W. Hazan, The Agricultural Program of Fascist
Italy, 15 J. FARM ECON. 489 (1933).
274- See Mordecai Ezekiel, European Competition in Agricultural Production
with Special Reference to Russia, 14 J. FARM ECON. 267, 271-73 (1932). But
cf. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1942 FOREIGN COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF
THE UNITED STATES 5, 346 (1942) (reporting that the Soviet Union had re-
sumed its role as a leading importer of American wheat and flour by the
1940s).
275. See Fite, supra note 238, at 657 (describing the McNary-Haugen plan
from its inception in the "parity" movement to two vetoes by President
Coolidge and its eventual death upon the election of President Hoover).
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gressive plan of protectionism: the notorious Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act.276 As retaliatory tariff barriers rose all over the
world, America's "most disastrous single mistake... in inter-
national relations"2 77 helped complete the rout in the wheat
market. Domestic supplies soared, exports dried up,27 8 and
prices crashed.279
The passage and successful defense of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 193820 enabled the Department of Agricul-
ture to expand the policy underlying the 1936 soil conservation
law: supply control. "The low prices [for wheat] were obviously
the result of the excessive supply,"28' and some constraint on
production seemed inevitable in spite of farmers' traditional
opposition to acreage restrictions.2 2 Congress amended the
1938 Act to triple the penalty on excess wheat even as it of-
fered greater price support.2 3 The support mechanism was
simple enough. By increasing the nonrecourse loan rate for
wheat," Congress guaranteed a higher minimum price for
participating producers. 25 The wheat program would have de-
livered "an average price.., of about $1.16 a bushel," for the
1941 crop year, "as compared with the world market price of 40
cents a bushel."2 6 To prevent the favorable price from gorging
276. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677k (1994)).
277. Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy as Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE
POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 291, 291 (Robert M. Stern ed.,
1987).
278. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("Largely as a result
of increased foreign production and import restrictions, annual exports of
wheat and flour from the United States during the ten-year period ending in
1940 averaged less than 10 per cent of total production, while during the
1920s they averaged more than 25 per cent.").
279. See U.S. DEP'T OFAGRIC., AGRICULTURAL STATIsTICs 10, 20, 22 (1942)
(noting a two-thirds decline in wheat prices between 1929 and 1932 and addi-
tional price drops in 1938, 1940, and 1941); Stern, supra note 210, at 901
(same).
280. See supra notes 247-249 and accompanying text.
281. Stern, supra note 210, at 902.
282. See F1TE, supra note 231, at 51-52.
283. See Filburn, 317 U.S. at 115-16.
284. See id. at 116 (noting that Congress had provided "for an increase in
the loans on wheat to 85 per cent of parity").
285. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp.,
646 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining how nonrecourse loan rates
set minimum commodity prices).
286. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 126.
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already overflowing stocks, the wheat program needed stiffer
penalties on excess production.287
But this was no ordinary program for rationalizing the
domestic distribution of a scarce commodity.288 The wheat crisis
assumed global proportions. In reviewing "the economics of the
wheat industry," the Filburn Court began by surveying
"[c]ommerce among the states in wheat."289 This maneuver,
reminiscent of Chief Justice Hughes's description of the
breathtaking scale of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corpora-
tion,290 was a facile sleight of hand. Although other Supreme
Court cases have hinged on the perceived need to maintain
uninhibited domestic trade in wheat,29' Filburn did not turn on
the "large and important" traffic between the sixteen wheat-
exporting states and their thirty-two wheat-importing counter-
parts.292 The real problem was the "abnormally large supply of
wheat" that throughout the 1930s had "caused congestion in a
number of markets; tied up railroad cars; and caused elevators
in some instances to turn away grains, and railroads to insti-
tute embargoes to prevent further congestion."293 Domestic
wheat stocks reached an all-time high in 1940.294 In the hal-
cyon days before World War I and the Great Depression,
American farmers might have unloaded the wheat abroad. But
tariff barriers erected throughout the 1930s had sealed off
287. See id. at 116. Virtually every price support mechanism is paired
with some sort of supply control. See J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus of
Government Regulation of Agriculture in the United States, 44 MERCER L.
REV. 763, 787-88 (1993).
288. The Court undertook this task in contemporaneous controversies over
broadcast licensing. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333(1945); FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239, 243 (1943); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940). See generally Jim
Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communica-
tions Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1431-40 (1995) (surveying this era's
broadcasting cases).
289. 317 U.S. at 125.
290. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1937).
291. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 34-36 (1923); Dah-
nke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290-92 (1922); Lemke v.
Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1921); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
131 (1877); cf Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922) (describing "the
various stockyards of the country as great national public utilities" that domi-
nated "the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to the
consumers in the East").
292. 317 U.S. at 125.
293. Id.
294. See Stern, supra note 210, at 901-02.
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many overseas markets. Foreign aid programs such as Lend-
Lease and general wartime increases in demand offered only
modest and evanescent relief.295
Filburn showed that the United States' competitors and
would-be customers matched the American response to the
wheat crisis:
Many countries, both importing and exporting, have sought to
modify the impact of the world market conditions on their own economy.
Importing countries have taken measures to stimulate production
and self-sufficiency. The four large exporting countries of Argentina,
Australia, Canada, and the United States have all undertaken various
programs for the relief of growers. Such measures have been de-
signed, in part at least, to protect the domestic price received by pro-
ducers. Such plans have generally evolved towards control by the
central government. [Footnote:] It is interesting to note that all of
these have federated systems of government, not of course without
important differences. In all of them wheat regulation is by the na-
tional government.296
This is Filburn's forgotten footnote. To my knowledge, this
passage linking the federal wheat program to the economic and
legal conditions that prevailed in 1941 has attracted the at-
tention of exactly one commentator, who reads this passage as
supporting the proposition that a state ordinarily cannot
"demand[] a price increase for its products."297 But Justice
Jackson's bombshell of a footnote communicates far more about
the political economy of federalism. One forgotten footnote is
worth a thousand Commerce Clause cases.
C. SPACIOUS SKIES (WHERE YOUR MANIFEST DESTINY LIES)
Filburn's forgotten footnote tells us as much about wheat
as it does about federalism. The roll call of leading exporters-
Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States-tells us
that wheat was being cultivated and exported around the
world, suggesting that no country, much less a political subdi-
vision, commanded substantial market power.2" Yet this roster
295. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., 1943 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
OF AGRICULTURE 135-36 (1944) (reporting increases in demand for wheat as
grain, as animal feed, and as a base for alcohol).
296. 317 U.S. at 125-26 & n.27.
297. Charles H. Clarke, Supreme Court Assault on the Constitutional Set-
tlement of the New Deal: Garcia and National League, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 39,
39 (1986).
298. Market power, or the power to affect prices by manipulating supply, is
virtually nil in a market populated by many competitors. See Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 & n.15 (1986); Matsushita Elec. In-
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is truly striking not for its diversity, but for its similarity. Al-
though three are predominantly Anglophone countries with
English legal traditions,299 Argentina's inclusion breaks any
necessary link between federalism and the common law. What
these countries share is size; the prevalence of English-
speaking, common law societies shows nothing more than
Great Britain's colonial prowess. 0 These are countries the
size of continents, with vast, temperate plains that support not
only massive agricultural exports, but also diverse, unruly
populations that warrant federalist government.
"Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they
are easily overlooked."0 1 Federalism is a function of territory
and terrain. We ought not to be surprised that geography has
such a profound impact on economics and political organization.
Throughout human history, a long east-west axis has facili-
tated the diffusion of goods and ideas-especially climate-
dependent agricultural innovations-across a large land
mass.30 2 The geographic factors that promote or retard the
spread of agriculture across a region are the very ones that
modulate all other sorts of diffusion: of genes, languages,
ideas.30 3 Topography matters at least as much as size, proba-
bly more. Even if "[there is no particular constraint on the
size" of "political communities," federalism emerges whenever
"linguistic, religious, and cultural features" define a geographi-
dus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1985); NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 & n.19 (1977). See generally William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937
(1981).
299. See generally, e.g., EDWIN R. BLACK, DIVIDED LOYALTIES: CANADIAN
CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM (1975); L.F. CRISP, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 1978); Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of
Canada and the United States, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1992).
300. Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 908 & n.34 (attributing Ameri-
can federalism to the "now uninteresting details of eighteenth century British
colonial administration" and the Australian and Canadian variants to
"nineteenth century British colonial administration") (emphasis omitted).
301. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
302. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF
HUMAN SOCIETIES 183-86 (1997) (hypothesizing that Eurasia's long east-west
axis facilitated more rapid transmission of agricultural innovations than on
other continents).
303. See Luigi L. Cavalli-Szorfa, Genes, Peoples and Languages, 265 Sci.
AM. 104 (1991); Luigi L. Cavalli-Szorfa et al., Reconstruction of Human Evolu-
tion: Bringing Together Genetic, Archaeological, and Linguistic Data, 85
PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 6002 (1988).
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cally distinct subcommunity within a population mass that is
otherwise coherent enough to achieve meaningful political un-
ion.3" More often than not, these differences arise from geo-
graphic isolation. Any attentive ear can detect the effect of
hilly terrain on voices that vary between Swiss villages and be-
tween Boston neighborhoods. Centrifugal pressures are sure
to splinter these otherwise compact communities. Size and to-
pography also explain instances in which federalism does not
arise. Internal geographic barriers have historically frag-
mented Europe beyond hope of a lasting union; a geographi-
cally integrated China long ago attained political unity and has
never really broken apart. 5 Neither Europe nor China,
though conducive to the diffusion of agriculture and other in-
novations, has ever achieved the sort of federal union found in
Filburn's wheat-growing republics.
Another striking aspect of Filburn's forgotten footnote is
the consensus that the wheat-exporting nations reached on the
need 'to protect the domestic price received by [wheat] produc-
ers."30 6 The Filburn Court overstated the "important differ-
ences" among the support programs in the four leading coun-
tries. This much is evident from even a cursory reading of the
forgotten footnote:
In Argentina wheat may be purchased only from the national
Grain Board. A condition of sale to the Board, which buys at pegged
prices, is the producer's agreement to become subject to restrictions
on planting. The Australian system of regulation includes the licensing
of growers, who may not sow more than the amount licensed, and
who may be compelled to cut part of their crops for hay if a heavy
crop is in prospect. The Canadian Wheat Board has wide control over
the marketing of wheat by the individual producer. Canadian wheat
has also been the subject of numerous Orders in Council.... [T]he
Wheat Board [exercises] full control [over] sale, delivery, milling and
disposition by any person or individual.
307
These programs shared the basic strategy and structure of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938: raise farm incomes by
304. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 941-42 (using Catalonia's persistent
independence within Spanish politics as an illustration of this phenomenon).
305. See DIAMOND, supra note 302, at 411-14. On federalism in China, see
generally Tahirih V. Lee, The Future of Federalism in China, in THE LEGAL
LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CHINESE LEGAL
CULTURE (James Feinerman et al. eds., forthcoming 1997-1998); Alwyn Young,
The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Repub-
lic of China (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
306. 317 U.S. at 126.
307. Id. at 126 n.27 (citations omitted).
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coupling price support with stringent supply controls.
Whether a government props commodity prices by extending
nonrecourse loans30 8 (as the United States did) or by making
public purchases at a generous price309 (as Argentina did) is
immaterial. The crucial point, again, is similarity: four wheat-
exporting nations with diverse legal traditions nevertheless
developed practically identical agricultural policies.
It is easy enough to understand why plans to support
wheat prices and wheat farmers' incomes "generally evolved
towards control by the central government."310 The existence of
a global market for wheat but not milk explains why price and
income support in the dairy industry can be a state-law enter-
prise, while comparable programs for wheat cannot. But the
question remains why Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the
United States adopted wheat programs at all. The parallel
adoption of wheat support programs was primarily a function
of domestic politics. The simultaneous emergence of punitive
tariffs and ruinous price and income support programs around
the world serves as a prime example of the prisoner's di-
lemma.311  Farmers threatened by the destructive macro-
economic situation of the 1930s successfully bargained vis-a-vis
the disorganized mass of consumers for an expensive support
package. 2 GATT being but a dim, distant vision past the im-
mediate concerns of a world at war, only national courts stood
between each country's agricultural policy and the staggering
collective loss in social welfare that would result from the im-
plementation of this special-interest legislation.
So why did the Supreme Court uphold the wheat program
in Filburn? A comparably discriminatory price support scheme
adopted by an American state, based on "customs duties [and]
308. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 646
F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining how nonrecourse loan rates set
minimum commodity prices).
309. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 257 F.2d 787, 790-92 (4th Cir. 1958)(explaining how government purchases set minimum commodity prices), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 837, 901 (1958).
310. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 126.
311. See generally Glenn W. Harrison et al, Costs of Agricultural Trade
Wars, in MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT POLICIES 330
(Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989) (providing a game-theoretic analysis of
this phenomenon).
312. See Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1565, 1571 (1995).
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regulations" designed to exclude competitors,313 would fla-
grantly violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The retaliatory
tariffs of the 1930s and 1940s would have constituted "the
paradigmatic Commerce Clause violation";31 4 the worldwide cry
that "farmers... must be protected against competition from
without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish alto-
gether," spelled "a speedy end" to global "solidarity."315 It bears
remembering that Chief Justice Rehnquist chided the West
Lynn majority for striking down a Massachusetts milk pricing
order that was only slightly less transparently protectionist
than the scheme invalidated by "the ill-starred opinion in
United States v. Butler."316
The answer, of course, is that the Constitution neither di-
rects nor permits the Supreme Court to subject federal statutes
to a supervening norm of international free trade.31 Deferen-
tial review of federal legislation under the Commerce Clause,
the very doctrine for which Filburn has become mythically fa-
mous, has no more bite than due process review of state eco-
nomic regulation. Filburn could no more have struck down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 on Commerce Clause
grounds than Nebbia v. New York 318 could have invalidated
New York's milk pricing statute on due process grounds.319
However much the theory of comparative advantage urges
"that the peoples of the [world] must sink or swim to-
gether,.., that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
313. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
314. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 203 (1994).
315. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); cf. KENICHI
OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL EcONOMIEs
62 (1995) ("If patriotism is... the last refuge of the scoundrel, wrapping out-
dated industry in the mantle of national interest is the last refuge of the eco-
nomically dispossessed.").
316. West Lynn, 512 U.S. at 216 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
317. But cf Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 & n.9 (1980) (stating
that dormant "Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a re-
straint on foreign commerce is alleged"); South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984) (plurality opinion) (same).
318. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
319. See FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 583 (1942)
(equating state and federal powers to fix commodity prices); Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 394 (1940) (same); United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569-71 (1939) (same).
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union and not division," the American Constitution is too
"parochial in range" to reach such global concerns.32 °
In short, although Filburn's wheat problem demonstrated
the maturity of American federalism, it also exposed a yawning
gap. In a more primitive union, under less sophisticated eco-
nomic conditions, agricultural distress would have prompted
uprisings by farm-dominated factions or even entire states.
Shay's Rebellion of 1786-87 and the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794
were relatively minor uprisings;3 21 the Civil War was the
paradigmatic example of agrarian revolt.3" Thanks to the
"common market" created by the Constitution,3  the flow of
wheat within America was never in doubt. The real problem,
evidently shared by Argentina, Australia, and Canada, was the
inability of the national political process to respond intelli-
gently to demands for price and income support. No legisla-
ture anywhere in the world could break the cycle of retaliatory
tariffs and ruinous domestic supports. Despite their size and
federal structure, the world's great wheat-growing republics
succumbed to the simple ailment called client politics. 324
Agricultural policy across the interwar world presaged the
political sclerosis that would eventually mark the decline of
Western social democracies.3 25  The wheat crisis of the early
twentieth century proved too big even for the federalist sys-
tems of the largest wheat-exporting countries. Like its coun-
terparts, the United States Congress awaited a deus ex ma-
320. But see Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522-23.
321. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208,226 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Kahanamoka, 327 U.S.
304, 320-21 (1946).
322. Cf Chen, supra note 229, at 1299 ("In 1861 the South seceded,
claiming for itself the political fruits that the farmer-dominated Constitu-
tional Convention had not delivered.").
323. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423(1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing "the Commerce Clauses overriding
requirement of a national common market" (internal quotations marks omit-
ted)); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)(same); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
350 (1977) (same).
324. See generally J.Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 368-69(1980) (defining "client politics" as the likely result "[w]hen the benefits of a
prospective policy are concentrated but the costs widely distributed").
325. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 153-59 (1971) (describing the rent-
seeking, welfare-destroying political behavior that occurs when a concentrated
lobby stands to reap the potential benefits and the potential costs are distrib-
uted across the population at large).
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china that would arrive only after world war proved the
peacekeeping value of free trade. The trade wars typified by
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act did not subside until the Bretton
Woods series of postwar economic talks,2 6 and the specific
types of trade at issue in Filburn would defy multilateral lib-
eralization until the end of the Uruguay Round.3" Though the
story of agriculture and GATT lies outside this Article's
scope,3 28 this glimpse suffices to show how Filburn might be
more profitably studied as a prologue to the emergence of
global economic federalism than as a postscript to the New
Deal's transformation of American federalism.329
D. THE NATURE OF THE FARM
One final strand remains in this revisionist narrative. The
wheat program upheld in Wickard v. Filburn had distinct dis-
tributional consequences within the United States. True, there
were no visible disruptions of internal traffic in wheat. Nor
were there drastic wealth transfers, aside from the usual insult
of "lev[ying] the heaviest taxes against poorer people to subsi-
dize mainly richer farmers."330 Roscoe Filburn himself symbol-
326. A 1944 conference in Bretton Woods, N.H., led to the establishment of
three leading institutions designed to regulate international economic rela-
tions: GATT, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (also known as the "World Bank). See
generally KENN=H W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND
EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982); Gerald M.
Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-Twenty-Five Years After, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 235 (1971); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Is There Law After Bretton Woods?, 50
U. CmI. L. REV. 380 (1983) (reviewing DAM, supra).
327. See Agreement on Agriculture, opened for signature April 15, 1994, in
URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 22, at 39.
328. See generally TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, STEFAN TANGERMANN & T.K
WARLEY, AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT (1996); Al J. Daniel, Jr. Agricultural Re-
form: The European Community, the Uruguay Round, and International Dis-
pute Resolution, 46 ARK. L. REV. 873 (1994); Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a
World of Comparative Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberaliza-
tion in the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INVL L.J. 123
(1989); Liane L. Heggy, Free Trade Meets U.S. Farm Policy: Life After the
Uruguay Round, 25 LAW & POLY INTIL Bus. 1367 (1994); Jimmye S. Hillman,
Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: A United States Perspective, 28 TULSA L.J.
761 (1993); Jeffrey J. Steinle, Note, The Problem Child of World Trade: Re-
form School for Agriculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333 (1995).
329. Cf. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 293 (1982) (describing
Filburn as [tihe last of the New Deal cases").
330. Robert Tempest Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies
and Goals of Federal Milk Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D.
L. REV. 662, 663 (1978). See generally Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48
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ized the biggest class of losers. Farms like his Ohio home-
stead-farms "maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, selling milk,
raising poultry, and selling poultry and eggs" in addition to
cultivating "a small acreage of winter [or spring] wheat"33' -
have become virtually extinct in the half-century since the Su-
preme Court last heard and rejected a constitutional challenge
to a statute regulating farm prices and incomes. Such are the
quirky consequences of agricultural rent-seeking.
The story of Filburn's role in restructuring rural America
begins, once again, with the recognition of wheat's incredible
versatility. Wheat differed from the other commodities in New
Deal agricultural controversies-cotton, tobacco, and milk-in
that many wheat producers could either sell their crop or use
the crop on the farm as animal feed.332 In this respect, wheat
more readily resembled corn. Whereas a "regulation of the
quantity of' tobacco reaching warehouses or cotton reaching
gins would control "virtually the entire supply" of these com-
modities,333 eighty-five percent of the corn produced in the Corn
Belt during the 1930s moved in commerce in the guise of corn-
fed livestock, poultry, or their milk or egg byproducts.3 34 A
smaller but comparable portion of the wheat crop was likewise
converted into meat, milk, poultry, or eggs. Consumption of
wheat "on the farm where grown appear[ed] to vary in an
amount greater than 20 per cent of average production."335 On-
farm wheat consumption would defeat a simpler supply control
strategy, for integrated farmers could evade a marketing quota
merely by redirecting grain to the feeding bin.336 Congress
thus decided to treat corn and wheat "alike with respect to the
feeding of poultry or livestock for market."331
Filburn's farm activities reflected the larger wheat market.
Contrary to the widespread myth that Roscoe Filburn con-
VAND. L. REV. 809, 860-62, 875 (1995) (outlining the distributive case against
using higher food prices to boost farmers' incomes).
331. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 114.
332. See supra text accompanying note 253-260.
333. Stern, supra note 210, at 902.
334. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1645, at 24 (1937); Stern, supra note 210 at 902.
335. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127.
336. See J.B. Hutson, Acreage Allotments, Marketing Quotas, and Com-
modity Loans as Means of Agricultural Adjustment, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE, 1940: FARMERS IN A CHANGING WORLD 551, 555
(1940); Stern, supra note 210, at 903.
337. S. REp. No. 76-1668, at 2 (1940), quoted in Stern, supra note 210, at
902.
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verted his excess wheat into home-baked loaves of bread,338 he
either stored the wheat for seed in a future, perhaps more
profitable growing season or, more likely, converted wheat into
milk, meat, poultry, and eggs. This transformation of a field
crop into refrigerated grocery staples requires nothing more
mysterious than the feeding of farm animals.339 The Filburn
farm engaged in an age-old practice of regulated firms:340 ma-
nipulating investments between a regulated line of business
(wheat) and nonregulated lines (meat, dairy, poultry, and
eggs). The Department of Agriculture responded in an equally
time-honored fashion by treating each wheat farmer's total
acreage in wheat as a workable surrogate for the "impossible
task" of "computing the actual quantity of wheat marketed by
each farmer in the form of wheat or meat."341 Reliance on acre-
age limitations allowed the wheat program to control prices
338. See, e.g., National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d
1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing Filburn as a case involving a "farmer's
consumption of bread baked from [his] own wheat"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2579 (1995); Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d
962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Filburn for the proposition "that wheat a
farmer bakes into bread and eats at home is part of Interstate commerce),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930 (1994). See generally Merritt, supra note 184, at
748-49 & n.316 (debunking the myth that "Farmer Filburn was... an organic
home baker who had decided to raise wheat for a few loaves of bread"). In-
deed, the image of Filburn as an enthusiastic consumer of home-baked bread
boggles the mind. To consume the 239 excess bushels he harvested in July
1941, see Filburn, 317 U.S. at 114, Filburn and his family would have had to
consume nearly 48 one-pound loaves of bread each day for a year. (This com-
putation is based on the assumption that one bushel of wheat yields 73 one-
pound loaves of bread. See Kansas Wheathearts Educational Website (visited
Sept. 1, 1997) <http'//www.hpj.com/wsdocs/whearts/whearts.htm>. In 1944,
farmers fed 20 times more wheat to livestock than they ground into flour for
home use. See USDA, FIELD AND SEED CROPS BY STATES, 1949-54, at 8 (1957)
(Stat. Bull. No. 208) [hereinafter FIELD AND SEED CROP REPORT]. One gets
the impression that the purveyors of Filburn's myth never actually read the
Supreme Coures opinion.
339. This act, and not the tilling of crop fields, may have been the first step
in the development of agriculture. See Constance Holden, Bringing Home the
Bacon, 254 SCIENCE 1398 (1994).
340. See, e.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945);
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930); City of Houston v. South-
western Bell Tel Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922); Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC,
896 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
341. Stern, supra note 210, at 903. Ironically, another office within the De-
partment of Agriculture, the Federal Extension Service, was exhorting Ameri-
can farmers to feed as much of their wheat crop to livestock, ostensibly to beef
up the protein profile of America's wartime diet, but not coincidentally to ease
the wheat glut. See U.S. DEPT OF AGRIC., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
OFAGRICULTURE 69,80 (1941).
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and supply not only in the market for the regulated commodity,
but also the conditions in a derivative product market.
What has come to be known as Filburn's myth of
"aggregation" was in fact the whopping economic impact of
many simultaneous, uncoordinated acts by a nation of verti-
cally integrated, diversified wheat producers. Just as there
was no way in Currin v. Wallace to separate tobacco destined
for domestic versus international markets,342 and no way in the
New Deal's milk marketing cases to identify distinct intrastate
and interstate markets,343 the on-farm versatility of wheat
made it impossible to distinguish wheat consumed on the farm
from wheat sold on the open market. The only difference was
that the tobacco warehouse in Currin seemed more tangible
than the global wheat market in Filburn; a single warehouse is
more obviously "the throat where tobacco enters the stream of
commerce."
344
To be sure, neither Filburn nor any other farmer acting
alone exercised enough power to affect the national market
merely by deciding either to sell wheat or to consume it by in-
tegrating wheat production with other on-farm activities. Fil-
burn had to take the market price as he found it; finding the
price less than fully satisfactory, he sought an alternative use
for his wheat. Such "price taking" has been the farmer's lot in
a world dominated by agribusiness purchasers.345 But Fil-
342. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939) ("IT]he transactions on
the tobacco market were conducted indiscriminately at virtually the same
time, and in a manner which made it necessary, if the congressional rule were
to be applied, to make it govern all the tobacco thus offered for sale.").
343. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120-21
(1942); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 568-69 (1939).
Contemporaneous dormant Commerce Clause cases disputed the extent to
which milk was crossing state lines. Compare Baldwin v. G.-AF. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (condemning a state milk-pricing statute as raising
"a barrier to traffic between one state and another as effective as if customs
duties... had been laid upon the thing transported") with Milk Control Bd. v.
Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 353 (1939) (observing that "[ojnly a
small fraction [of milk] produced by farmers in Pennsylvania is shipped out of
the Commonwealth").
344. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 (1939); cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 35 (1937) (using a similar "throat" metaphor to de-
scribe an impediment to interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S.
495, 516 (1922) (same).
345. See National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816,
825-26 (1978) (describing the "price taking" that occurs when farmers in an
almost perfectly competitive market must sell to concentrated agribusiness
purchasers); id. at 829 (Brennan, J., concurring) (same); id. at 840 (White, J.,
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burn's seemingly discrete act, multiplied across a large popu-
lation of farmers, profoundly affected prices and supplies in the
larger market for wheat. "Untouched, unassailable, undefiled,
that mighty world-force, that nourisher of nations, wrapped in
Nirvanic calm, indifferent to the human swarm, gigantic, re-
sistless, moved onward in its appointed grooves."346  When
coupled with relatively inelastic demand for wheat as food and
seed,347 on-farm consumption packed the wallop of wheat sales
on the Board of Trade, where even the pre-New Deal Court
easily discerned that "s]ales of an article which affect the
country-wide price of the article directly affect the country-
wide commerce in it."348 Congress emphatically had the power
to regulate these transactions.
Constitutional correctness aside, what were the practical
consequences of Filburn and the commodity program it up-
held? Only a farm like Filburn's, one integrating grain pro-
duction with livestock or poultry operations, could freely switch
between selling wheat on the open market, storing it to await
higher prices, and feeding it to farm animals. As the Filburn
Court recognized, however, there were vast regional differences
in farm organization. In the wheat-exporting states of the West
and Midwest, many farmers "specializ[ed] in wheat,.., the
concentration on this crop reache[d] 27 per cent of the crop
land, and the average harvest [ran] as high as 155 acres."
349
By contrast, some states in New England-a net wheat-
importing region and the cradle of the American family
farm35 -devoted "less than one per cent of the crop land.., to
wheat" and harvested "less than five acres per farm."351 As a
rule, larger farms specializing in wheat marketed their har-
dissenting) (same); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940) (same).
346. FRANK NORRIs, THE OcroPus: A STORY OF CALIFORNIA 360 (Doubleday
& Co. rpt. 1947) (1901).
347. See Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127 ("The total amount of wheat consumed as
food varies but relatively little, and use as seed is relatively constant."); Stem,
supra note 210, at 904.
348. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 40 (1923); cf Santa Cruz
Fruit Pacldng Co. v. NLRB, 310 U.S. 453, 464 (1938) (detecting readily "a con-
tinuous flow ofinterstate commerce" in a stream of "fiuits and vegetables... grown
in California" and shipped entirely within that state).
349. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 126-27.
350. See Taylor, supra note 232, at 476-80; cf. MARK KRAMER, THREE
FARMS: MAKING MILK, MEAT, AND MONEY FROM THE AMERICAN SOIL 20, 38-42
(2d ed. 1987) (describing the especially tenuous economic position of New
England farmers).
351. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127.
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vests, while smaller, integrated farms used wheat for purposes
ranging from animal feed to "a nurse crop for grass seeding" to
a mere "cover crop to prevent soil erosion and leaching."
35 2
Thanks to the uneven geographic distribution of wheat special-
ists versus integrated farmers, the program upheld in Filburn
systematically shifted wealth away from smaller, integrated
farms in the East (including Ohio) and toward larger, specialized
farms in the West. A political system based on proportional
representation might muster some opposition to such a trans-
parently regional wealth transfer,353 but one cannot expect this
sort of resistance in a federalist nation that enshrines geo-
graphic representation in its Senate.354
The Filburn Court was fully aware of the shadow that the
Agricultural Adjustment Act was casting on traditional American
agriculture. Justice Jackson explicitly acknowledged that
wheat which "is never marketed ... supplies a need of the man
who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases
in the open market."355 There is no better statement in United
States Reports of Ronald Coase's Nobel Prize-winning observa-
tion that vertical integration and open-market purchases are
flip sides of the same economic phenomenon.356 The Filburn
Court even recognized how the wheat program might have
"forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they could
provide for themselves" and therefore served as "an unfair
promotion of the. markets and prices of specializing wheat
352. Id. This portion of Filburn unequivocally gives the lie to the New
Deal's fraudulent characterization of wheat as a "soil-depleting" crop. See su-
pra text accompanying note 246.
353. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819) ("The
exigencies of the nation may require that ... treasure raised in the north
should be transported to the south, that raised in the east conveyed to the
west, or that this order should be reversed.").
354. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institu-
tion Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21 (1997); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 159 (1995);
Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 213
(1995); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571-77 (1964) (refusing to extrapolate
any constitutional significance from the geographically based organization of
the United States Senate).
355. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 128.
356. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 388, 392
(1937). Only one federal court has ever cited The Nature of the Firm. See
Herzog Contracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp., 976 F.2d 1062, 1067 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing Coase as indirect support for the proposition that "[clommon
ownership of corporations is designed in part to bring transactions within the
affiliated group that would otherwise have been made with unrelated firms").
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growers."357 The wheat program had precisely this effect: from
1944 to 1954, the proportion of the American wheat market
that was consumed on the farm where it was grown fell from
16 to 10 percent.358 As the Court eventually concluded in its
dormant Commerce Clause cases, however, "neither half of the
commerce clause protects the particular structure or methods
of operation in a... market."359 Confronted with the plea that
the wheat program was favoring Western monocultures over
Eastern family farmers' integrated operations, the Court
pleaded judicial impotence: "with the wisdom, workability, or
fairness, of [this] plan of regulation we have nothing to do."
360
Though Filburn is often lauded, and rightly so, as an emblem of
judicial deference to the superior expertise and accountability of
legislative decisionmakers, this aspect of the opinion "follow[s]
the example of Pontius Pilate,... for two thousand years...
the condemnable paradigm of terminal leave from judgment."361
What then, after Filburn, is truth?362 You shall know the
truth, and the truth shall set you free.363 The agricultural
357. 317 U.S. at 129.
358. The following chart illustrates the decline of on-farm consumption of
wheat after Wickard v. Filburn:
Date Seedt Feed Foodt Sold On-Farm
Percentage
1944 63,934 104,011 5409 886,757 16.35%
1945 63,980 98,876 4470 940,297 15.11%
1946 69,039 88,406 3861 990,812 14.00%
1947 72,244 94,766 4023 1,187,878 12.59%
1948 73,046 98,020 3475 1,120,370 13.48%
1949 60,686 84,984 2903 949,842 13.53%
1950 65,478 74,222 2836 876,808 13.98%
1951 66,194 66,663 2639 852,665 13.71%
1952 68,704 64,860 2576 1,170,300 10.42%
1953 53,216 65,167 2410 -1,052,278 10.30%
1954 47,862 49,639 2191 884,208 10.13%
in thousands of bushels
See FIELD AND SEED CROP REPORT, supra note 338, at 8.
359. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978); accord
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93-94 (1987).
360. 317 U.S. at 129.
361. MiLNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAw 138 (1993).
362. See John 18:38.
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statute upheld in Filburn accelerated the destruction of the
very type of farmer who lost this monumental case. Shortly af-
ter Filburn, agricultural analysts were seriously asking the
question that Coase had posed to students of industrial organi-
zation: "Why is not all production carried on by one big
firm?"31 By 1957, Harvard economists invented a new word,
agribusiness, to describe "the sum total of all operations in-
volved in the manufacture and distribution of farm supplies;
production operations on the far; and the storage, processing,
and distribution of farm commodities and items made from
them."365 Marginal farms folded, average farm size mush-
roomed, and industry began performing "virtually all [the] op-
erations relating to growing, processing, storing, and mer-
chandising food and fiber" that had been "a function of the
farm." 366 And so vertical integration on the farm yielded to
vertical integration of the farm. There is but a vowel's differ-
ence between the firm and the farm;367 the nature of the firm
dictates the destiny of the farm.3 68
In fairness to the regulators who devised the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Justices who upheld it, the
demolition of the traditional farm economy was probably inevi-
table. "Whatever the government did or did not do, it seemed
certain by the late 1940s and 1950s that the decline in the
number of farms and farmers was irreversible."369 The social,
economic, and technological changes wrought by world war or-
dained as much. Full deployment of mechanical power, fertil-
izer, and pesticides has sustained the flow of cheap grain since
World War 11.370 Abundant and cheap, purchased feed has all
363. See John 8:32.
364. Coase, supra note 356, at 394.
365. JOHN H. DAVIS & RAY A. GOLDBERG, A CONCEPT OF AGRIBUSnESS 2(1957) (emphasis added).
366. Id. at 1; see also id. at 4 (describing traditional agriculture "as more orless a self-contained industry," characterized by "typical farm famil[ies]" that
"produced [their] own food, fuel, shelter, draft animals, feed, tools, and im-
plements and most of [their] clothing").
367. See Chen & Adams, supra note 229, at 402 (equating concerns about
"farm size" with concerns about "firm size").
368. Cf., e.g., Andrew P. Barkley, The Determinants of the Migration of
Labor out of Agriculture in the United States, 1940-85, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
567, 571 (1990) (evaluating the impact of higher nonfarm wages on exodus
from farming); Yoav Kislev & Willis Peterson, Prices, Technology, and Farm
Size, 90 J. POL. ECON. 578, 579 (1982) (noting that increasing urban incomes
prompt farmers to exit and leaves a landscape of fewer, larger farms).
369. FITE, supra note 231, at 123.
370. See DAvID GOODMAN & MICHAEL REDCLIFT, REFASHIONING NATURE:
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but displaced home-grown grain and shifted a correspondingly
large proportion of the American livestock population from
pastures and the range to feedlots.371 In the half-century after
the war, the farm population of the United States fell from
roughly twenty-five percent of the total to less than two per-
cent. 2 But Filburn and the commodity programs it blessed
surely hastened the fading of the agrarian dream. The schol-
arly consensus is that federal intervention has exacerbated the
inequities of the modern agricultural economy. 3 For a pro-
gram whose "major objectives have been to preserve or restore
existing structures or conditions," the agricultural policy of the
United States has failed even on its own economically dubious
terms.3 74 The intended beneficiaries of the New Deal have the
bitterest view of its agricultural legacy. The self-appointed ad-
vocates of small American farmers have neither forgotten nor
forgiven the federal government's apparent complicity in the
rout; the agrarian left has uniformly condemned post-
Depression farm programs for aggravating the trend toward
fewer, larger, more industrialized farms. 75 "Hell has no fury
like a duped agrarian."376
Comparing Filburn with United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, 377 decided only four years earlier, reveals the proper place
of these agricultural cases in the constitutional canon. Indeed,
the most important lessons from each case can be reduced to
two footnotes, one celebrated and the other thoroughly ne-
FOOD, ECOLOGY, AND CULTURE 109-10 (1991).
37L See id.; JAMES R. SIMPSON & DONALD E. FARRIS, THE WORLD'S BEEF
BUSINESS 37, 51 (1982).
372. See Chen & Adams, supra note 229, at 381 & n.129; Neil D. Hamilton,
Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72
NEB. L. REV. 210, 218-20 (1993).
373. See generally Christopher R. Kelley, Rethinking the Equitites of Fed-
eral Farm Programs, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 659 (1994) (reviewing the economic
and legal literature).
374. D. Gale Johnson, U.S. Agricultural Programs as Industrial Policy, in
INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 307, 308
(S.R. Johnson & S.A Martin eds., 1993).
375. See, e.g., MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEW ECONOMIC
VISION 131-34 (1988); INGOLF VOGELER, THE MYTH OF THE FAMILY FARM:
AGRIBUSINESS DOMINANCE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE 170-85 (1981). For a guide
to the arcane distinctions between left and right within the agricultural com-
munity, see generally Curtis E. Beus & Riley E. Dunlap, Conventional Versus
Alternative Agriculture: The Paradigmatic Roots of the Debate, 55 RURAL
SOCIOL. 590 (1990).
376. Chen, supra note 329, at 846.
377. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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glected. Carolene Products' famous footnote3 78 foretells the
trampling of underrepresented consumer interests in the special
interest state.37 9 Filburn's forgotten footnote shows how fed-
eralism, a function of the physical geography of nations, not
only failed to rescue the United States from a global wheat
crisis but also expedited a controversial and probably unin-
tended redistribution of domestic wealth. The two cases expose
serious structural shortcomings that modern constitutional
doctrine has not vanquished. Carolene Products adopted a
faulty model of judicial review, while Filburn proved the limits
of a federalism that stretches from sea to shining sea, but no
further. In other words, whereas Carolene Products confounds
Alexander Hamilton's logic in the Seventy-eighth Federalist
Paper, Filburn undermines James Madison's confidence in the
giant republic of the Tenth Federalist Paper.380 Both phenom-
ena arise from the problems of public choice and the same
transaction cost analysis that generated Ronald Coase's foun-
dational works on law and economics, The Problem of Social
Cost 381 and The Nature of the Firm.382
Perhaps we can be rescued by the myth of Wickard v. Fil-
burn. The post-Darby Supreme Court, after all, vindicated
central authority in Filburn by upholding Congress's power to
defeat self-dealing. That power proved sufficient to undo Ro-
scoe Filburn's decision to plant twelve extra acres of wheat, but
wavered in the face of the farm lobby's power politics during
the New Deal. Far from lamenting "centripetal forces" in fed-
eral systems, as Professor Friedman would have us do,383 we
should celebrate the regular reassertion of central authority. 38 4
The centripetal abasement of state sovereignty is what allows
378. See id. at 153 n.4.
379. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRrrIcA INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the
Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77
CAL. L. REV. 83 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products,
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Prod-
ucts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
380. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton) with THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (Madison).
381. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
382. See Coase, supra note 356.
383. See Friedman, supra note 120, at 365-78.
384. Cf Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 909 ("The Supreme Court
should never invoke federalism as a reason for invalidating a federal statute
or as a principle for interpreting it.").
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a central authority to save any federation's states from them-
selves and their incurably corrupt political processes. Cen-
tripetal supremacy, not centrifugal subsidiarity, should be the
animating principle in all systems of federalism.385 Filburn's
failure, if indeed it can be called a failure, did not lie in over-
stating Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.
Rather, it lay in the failure of the United States and its trading
partners to establish a worldwide system of economic cooperation
before World War II proved the value of free trade.
Far beyond merely facilitating the efficient allocation of a
political union's collective resources, federalism profoundly af-
fects the distribution of wealth within the union's constituent
states. So obvious a point should not have escaped our attention,
but unfortunately it has. Replacing hollow political theory
with an awareness of practical consequences represents the
first step toward a true understanding of the law and econom-
ics of federalism.
V. THE NATURE OF THE STATE
Our romantic image of federalism is "a throwback to a time
of true heroes, not of the brittle, razzle dazzle boys that had
sprung up around the jack rabbit ball-a natural not seen in a
dog's age." 86 But a realistic view of history will surely erase
such sweetness and light. More than even baseball, federalism has
been "'the great American tragedy.'" 38 7 Federalism has always
grown out of war. The first economic war among the newly in-
dependent American states "was the immediate cause that led
to the forming of a [constitutional] convention";388 the second
led to a bloodbath and constitutional reform of cataclysmic
385. But see Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3b, 31 I.L.M. 247
(limiting actions by the European Union "[iln areas which do not fall within
its exclusive competence" to only those matters that "cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States").
386. BERNARD MALAMUD, THE NATURAL 169 (1952).
387. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972) (quoting George Bernard
Shaw).
388. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., con-
curring in the judgment); accord Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1595 (1997); see also Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida
Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (describing the desire "to avoid the ten-
dencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued" the colonies and
doomed the Articles of Confederation as an "immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional Convention"); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26
(1979) (same).
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proportions. Filburn, for its part, foreshadowed by its failure a
new birth of economic freedom for the First World. By these
measures, the race to outbid other states for baseball teams
and chopstick factories scarcely warrants the hyperbolic label
of "war." Economic interdependence have made real secession
and real civil war utterly unthinkable.3 9
If history's various economic wars-real, rhetorical, and
otherwise-teach us anything, it is the enduring value of free
trade. The common market established by the Constitution is
one of the most important baselines in American law.390
Though heavily laden with economic and political values worth
protecting by constitutional means,3 91 free trade too often is ob-
scured by the obsession with state sovereignty that is Amer-
ica's national neurosis.392 State sovereignty and the traditional
vision of American federalism have their champions,393 but free
trade has the greater claim to being an underenforced, under-
valued constitutional norm.394 The most effective guarantor of
free trade within the United States, the dormant Commerce
Clause rests on the assumption that residual federal power
over contrary local legislation should be asserted even in the
absence of congressional action.395 "[A] federal decision to forgo
regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal
determination that the area is best left unregulated."396
389. Cf Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 947 ("Nebraska and New Jer-
sey are not going to break away from the United States, and we will continue
to debate and decide the issues that confront us as a single polity.").
390. See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. Lobman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (1994)(describing the "securing [of] a national area of free trade" as the "central ob-jective" of the dormant commerce clause (internal quotation marks omitted));
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (same);
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (same).
391. See Collins, supra note 142.
392. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 154, at 908.
393. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207(1994).
394. See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
395. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769-70 (1945)(noting that "Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of
power over interstate commerce" but that "in general Congress has left it to
the courts to formulate the rules" case by case); South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (noting that "[tihe commerce
clause, by its own force prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce")
(emphasis added).
396. Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
375, 384 (1983); accord Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil &
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The usual justification for centralized judicial review of lo-
cal economic legislation is horizontal; it seeks to guarantee
equality among competitors without regard to state citizenship
and to force recalcitrant states to bestow their privileges and
immunities on residents and outsiders alike.3 97 International
trade law often reduces this concern to the shibboleth of
"fairness" among competitors.398 American constitutional law
is no different; conventional dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence stresses separation of powers as its principal institu-
tional concern and horizontal equality as its principal norma-
tive goal. Critics fret about the weakness of the doctrine's
constitutional basis,399 but the Court nevertheless persists in
protecting out-of-state competitors4°° and the national market
at large.4" Judicial intervention is especially likely when a
state is stupid enough to codify its discriminatory designs in
geographic terms, or too effective in exporting costs. The in-
consistencies in the cases have arguably resulted from the col-
Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 422 (1986); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (subjecting a state statute to a fatal equal protection
analysis even though Congress had already waived any dormant commerce
clause objections to the state law).
397. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.");
cf Matthew Adler, What States Owe Outsiders, 20 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 391
(1992).
398. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental
Standards: The Level-Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1,
7-14 (1996) (noting the rhetorical prominence of "fairness" in debates over in-
ternational trade); Robert E. Hudec, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: The Concept
of Fairness in United States Trade Policy, in CANADA, JAPAN, AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 1990, at 88 (same).
399. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S.
888, 897-98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Julian N. Eule,
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-35
(1982); Martin Redish & Shane Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 571-73, 582-90.
400. See, e.g., South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177,
185 n.2 (1938); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315 (1851);
Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV.
125, 133.
401. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671
(1981) (plurality opinion) (striking down an Iowa trucking regulation that was
"out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States"); Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 526-30 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 773-74 (1945); cf. C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 407 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing "the potential for conflicts" among the "many jurisdictions
[that] are contemplating or enacting flow control" as a reason for striking
down a local flow control ordinance) (emphasis added).
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lision between institutional fears over this doctrine's weak con-
stitutional pedigree and a normative preference for open mar-
kets.
To rationalize this jurisprudential morass, we can enlist
Ronald Coase's comprehensive theory of firms, the market, and
the law. On the sixtieth anniversary of Coase's first great
breakthrough, let us base a more comprehensive economic the-
ory of federalism on The Nature of the Firm. Despite relative
inattention from courts and constitutional scholars, Coase's
1937 masterpiece is widely acknowledged as the foundational
work for modern theories of industrial organization. We con-
stitutionalists have missed an obvious but devastating anal-
ogy: federalism follows structures and patterns akin to those of
vertical integration and coordination by private firms. Deci-
sions to delegate and assume sovereign authority bear more
than a passing resemblance to the vertical mergers, price re-
straints, and territorial restrictions targeted by antitrust law-
the very interactions that shape the nature of the firm.40 2
What the United States is unwilling or unable to do on its own,
it may delegate downward to its constituent states or concede
upward to one of the multinational arrangements to which it
belongs. The stunning question that Coase used to revolution-
ize the study of industrial organization can now be rephrased
in public law terms: Why is there ever more than one sover-
eign, and only one, in the world?
Unlike a private firm, the entrepreneurial sovereign faces
at least three options for minimizing its own costs: integration
within some system of federalism, open-market purchases, and
coercive regulation of the market." 3 The interaction between
the second and third options illustrates how government si-
multaneously operates in two interrelated markets: the market
for goods and services, and the market for votes and campaign
contributions.4" This is the true sense in which "States simply
are different from private parties and have a different role to
402. But cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619 n.8
(1981) (declining to endorse the "view that the Commerce Clause injects prin-
ciples of antitrust law into the relations between the States").
403. Cf South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984)
(plurality opinion) (noting that a state can "support" an in-state "processing
industry by selling only to [in-state] processors, by vertical integration, or by
direct subsidy").
404. For merely one illustration of the interplay between these markets, see
Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General
and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 73 (1976).
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play" in the constitutional scheme.405 Goveniment's unique
power to subsidize inefficient transactions through coercive
taxation or regulation explains the distinction between the
proprietary and regulatory capacities of government, 40 6 and
why the law "treats state action differently from private action"
in the latter setting.4 7 As private firms must choose between
vertical integration and open-market purchases, so too gov-
ernments must choose between direct subsidization of public
works "through general taxes or municipal bonds" and the con-
stitutionally suspect alternative of "discriminatory regula-
tion."4 8 The traditional American preference for such alterna-
tives as public utility regulation over direct public ownership 40 9
merely reflects the relatively high political cost of transparent
public decisions to tax and spend. As agency costs and the
transaction costs of negotiating contracts are to private firms,
so are the flaws of the political marketplace to governments.
Whereas "firms[] arise to minimize transaction costs in pro-
duction," "the whole federalist institutional structure of the
state might be formed to minimize the transaction costs of
making collective decisions."410
In short, free trade as federalism's primary economic divi-
dend looks different when viewed through the twin lenses of
industrial organization and public choice. These are the eco-
nomic subdisciplines that shed the greatest light on the myth-
shrouded mysteries of Wickard v. Filburn, and we have no rea-
son to doubt their explanatory power in other settings. Future
studies would do well to add these items to the economic toolkit
already used to dissect federalism: the theory of comparative
advantage, game theory, and certain other aspects of positive
political theory. Coase's model of industrial organization de-
scribes government and federalism at least as well as it does
private firms and vertical integration, and public choice ex-
405. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, 475
U.S. 282, 290 (1986).
406. See Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-
Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980).
407. Gould, 475 U.S. at 290.
408. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994);
see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (expressing a
similar preference for general revenue taxes or municipal bonds).
409. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 181-83
(1982).
410. MUELLER, supra note 163, at 73 & n.13. See generally Gordon Tul-
lock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1969).
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plains the presence and significance of the additional transac-
tion costs in the state's economic calculus.
Some economic sophistication of this sort already perme-
ates American case law. In the two decades since the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause and the market-participant doc-
trine burst into the modern constitutional imagination, the
high court's cases have come to reflect (albeit slowly and unsys-
tematically) a more sophisticated understanding of the nature
of the state. By immunizing a generous number of state ac-
tivities from dormant Commerce Clause review, the Court at
first invited states to buy the right to discriminate. "Put your
money where your discriminatory mouth is," the Court all but
said in Hughes41 and Reeves, 412 "and we shall blind ourselves
to your bias." One cannot miss the striking parallels to Derrick
Bell's bitter critique of antidiscrimination law413 and to the
Court's later endorsement of Congress's use of its purse to
evade constitutional limits on the enumerated powers of the
federal government.4
At first the Court ignored local governments' efforts to
project their regulatory powers downstream. Even subcontrac-
tors, though formally one degree of privity removed from a lo-
cality's proprietary involvement, were considered "in a sub-
stantial if informal sense" to be "working for the city."415 The
Court crafted the constitutional equivalent of antitrust law's
safe harbor for intraenterprise conspiracies. 6 The unexpected
revival of the Privileges and Immunities Clause marked the
beginning of the Court's growing awareness of state and local
governments' power over certain markets,41 7 and soon a plural-
411. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
412. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
413. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PER-
MANENCE OF RACISM 8-9 (1992).
414. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
415. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204, 211, n.7 (1983).
416. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984); cf. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370
U.S. 19, 29 (1962) (declining to give legal effect to de minimis "organizational
distinctions").
417. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 221 (1984) (holding that the governmental "exercise of power to bias
the employment decisions of private contractors and subcontractors against
out-of-state residents may be called to account under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause," even though the same conduct would be immunized by the
market-participant doctrine from commerce clause review).
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ity of Justices adopted a sharp distinction between a state's
lawful efforts to limit its purchases or sales to its own residents
and a state's unlawful efforts to impose downstream restraints
on subsequent transactions.418 By the time the Court extended
its First Amendment restraints on political patronage to cases
involving independent contractors, 419 the jurisprudential rever-
sal seemed complete. Even the transformation of the Contracts
Clause from a limitation on regulation to a limitation on legis-
lative interference with public contracts appeared to reflect the
Justices' growing appreciation of the pitfalls of "bargaining
with the state."420
In the end, the case law seems to have settled on a dis-
tinction between ordinarily lawful subsidies and ordinarily un-
constitutional efforts to discriminate through taxation or
regulation. This evidently stable legal position embodies an
instinct well grounded in public choice and the political econ-
omy of lawmaking. Because a subsidy or direct "market par-
ticipation" with the state's own limited funds is transparent
and can be countered by the ordinary political process, courts
are more willing to tolerate discrimination in proprietary, or
"vertically integrated," acts of state than discrimination via co-
ercive taxation or regulation.421  Some "significant group
of... citizens... can be counted upon to use their votes to
keep [government] from raising [any] tax excessively."42 The
418. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98
(1984) (plurality opinion); cf. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331, 339 n.6 (1982) (describing a ban on electricity exports from a state
as "more than regulat[ion of] the use of a resource (the state] assertedly
owns").
419. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353
(1996); Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
420. Compare Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (upholding a
state law regulating private contracts) and Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (same) with United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (striking down a state's attempt to
repeal a covenant in a contract between itself and holders of bonds issued by
that state). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE
(1994).
421 See Coenen, supra note 38, at 479; Collins, supra note 142, at 103;
Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx L. REV. 1098, 1138(1988); Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 406, at 1129, 1131; cf. West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (recognizing this political limitation on state power but refusing
to rely upon it in agreeing to invalidate a targeted subsidy scheme).
422. Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 545 (1983); accord West
Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525
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same cannot be said of less easily detected regulatory intrusions
into the marketplace. International economic law implicitly
acknowledges the power of political transparency by exempting
"procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased
for governmental purposes" and "payment of subsidies exclu-
sively to domestic producers, including ... subsidies effected
through governmental purchases" from GATT's "national
treatment" provisions.42 3 Similarly, in the context of the Min-
neapolis Manifesto, American constitutional law should be
prepared to tolerate interjurisdictional competition for sports
franchises and other businesses, but only to the extent that the
boondoggles are transparent and capable of being patrolled by
the political process.
Filtered through the lens of economic analysis, federalism
has transcended its traditional classification as a constitu-
tional law subject. Even as public utility regulation has been
analyzed as a species of taxation,424 trade law, domestic or in-
ternational, is also a species of taxation. Debates over central
supremacy versus state subsidiarity in federalism are thinly
veiled debates over tax policy. Protectionist schemes such as
those illustrated by Carbone, West Lynn, and Filburn display
local, state, and federal regulators in their full glory "as tax
collector[s] par excellence."425 Ideally, judicial enforcement of a
free trade norm would soften the protectionist blow on the
groups least likely to defend themselves through the political
process. A fully informed economic vision of structural issues
in constitutional law must therefore acknowledge federalism as
merely one of many variations on the overriding theme qf pub-
lic law: taxing and spending in the special-interest state.
This invigorated view of federalism as a fiscal engine de-
serves to be stretched to its logical conclusion. Like many an-
other constitutional debate that "has degenerated into...
deadlock" within a stifling "equal protection paradigm,"4 2 ' the
conventional, fairness-based vision of federalism is intellectu-
ally bankrupt. "Fair," to mince no words, is foul. In either its
n.15 (1988).
423. GATT 1947, supra note 22, art. I11.8.
424- See Richard A- Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SdL 22 (1971).
425. Chen, supra note 14, at 1046; ef ELI WINSTON CLEMENS, EcONOMIcS
AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 526 (1950) (assigning the title of "tax collectors par ex-
cellence" to public utility companies).
426. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1843
(1996).
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affirmative or its dormant manifestation, "[t]he Commerce
Clause... is less concerned with protecting the rights of inter-
state businesses than with preserving an appropriate balance
between state and federal powers and, in particular, with pre-
cluding states from efforts to channel or distort interstate eco-
nomic activity."427 It is far past time to adopt an explicitly ver-
tical approach to federalism, with political transparency as the
primary institutional concern and the same redistributive in-
stincts that underlie progressive taxation as the primary nor-
mative goal. By deemphasizing the horizontal aspects of fair-
ness-equality between trading partners, between outsiders
and citizens within any participating jurisdiction-and
stressing in their stead the vertical notions of fairness as be-
tween rich and poor, as between the politically dominant and
the disenfranchised, the economically informed study of fed-
eralism can defend free trade as a norm that promotes both the
efficient allocation of wealth and its equitable distribution.
Admittedly, a vertical approach to federalism will lower
the comfort level in this field, for the law and economics move-
ment has largely adhered to the dogma that "economics does
not answer the question whether [any given] distribution of in-
come and wealth is good or bad."428 But struggle we must. We
are unlikely to advance the debate by revisiting questions of
allocation when no one disputes the theory of comparative ad-
vantage but many would limit free trade out of concern for its
impact on organized labor and the environment.429 It is not the
maximization of local welfare but the dispersion of local wealth
that puts the fire into the Minneapolis Manifesto's debate over
stadium subsidies. Or, as Coase stated the point, "problems of
welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aes-
thetics and morals."40
427. Enrich, supra note 71, at 468.
428. ICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 14 (4th ed.
1992). But cf. id. §§ 16.1-16.7, at 455-77 (reconsidering the blanket assertion
that economic analysis has nothing to say about the distributional desirability
of a certain law); Chen & Gifford, supra note 106, at 1362 (suggesting that law
and economics has answered most of the allocative questions available and
must therefore tunm to distributional questions).
429. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.
14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 LL.M. 1480; North American Agreement on La-
bor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499; 19 U.S.C.
§ 3311(b)(2) (1994) (incorporating these so-called side agreements into
NAFTA); id. § 3471 (labor standards); id. § 3472 (environmental standards).
430. Coase, supra note 381, at 43.
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Economic analysis tends to universalize theories of federal-
ism. Regardless of the political context of any specific federal sys-
tem, the model of comparative advantage will raise similar al-
locative questions, and the implicit questions of tax policy
embedded in federalist structures will raise familiar distribu-
tive questions time and again. The inexorable political ten-
dency to shift costs onto unrepresented or structurally ineffective
groups persists everywhere. The geographic scope of a federal-
ist system is subordinate to the geographic footprint of the
market that the governments in question wish to subsidize. In
Carbone, West Lynn, and Filburn alike, a local jurisdiction-
Clarkstown, Massachusetts, the United States-exploited a le-
gally imposed restraint of trade to redirect consumer dollars to
favored producers, in lieu of a much more politically expensive
program relying solely on direct subsidies financed by general
tax revenues. In the two dormant Commerce Clause cases
from 1994, a national tribunal was able to spare local consumers
and redirect public spending decisions back to a more politi-
cally accountable forum. By contrast the New Deal Commerce
Clause jurisprudence perfected in Filburn ratified Congress's
last step toward American agricultural autarky. The differ-
ence lies in the territorial reach of the governments involved
vis-a-vis the scope of the market at issue, not in any intrinsic
difference in kind between the two sides of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence or between domestic and international systems
of federalism.
Having committed ourselves to the economic equivalent of
an "integrative" jurisprudence that synthesizes political, moral,
and historical evidence, 31 we should welcome open exchange in
domestic and international perspectives on the primordial con-
stitutional question called free trade. In a world filled with
distinct but structurally comparable federal systems, let us
march toward a unified field theory of federalisms, in the plu-
ral.4 32 The race to the bottom, interstate externalities, and the
431. See Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics,
Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779 (1988).
432. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 408 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958); Ann Althouse, Variations
on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE
L.J. 979, 1020 (1993); Bednar, supra note 115; Martha A. Field, The Differing
Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107 (1992); Christopher K. Leman & Robert H. Nelson, The Rise of Manage-
rial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 984
(1982); Daniel S. Miller, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in
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intractable problems of public choice in the special-interest
state have replaced separation of powers as the principal insti-
tutional concerns animating federalism-anywhere, anytime.
What we call federalism lies at the heart of every vertical dis-
tribution of governmental power, whether downward from the
United States to its constituent states and their political, sub-
divisions,433 or upward from sovereign nations to the still ex-
panding framework of the World Trade Organization. The
"experience" of other federal systems "may... cast an empiri-
cal light on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem," especially "the problem of reconciling central
authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing
autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity."434 To
move beyond the realm of baseball and boondoggles, to advance
the agenda of the Minneapolis Manifesto and the mission of
the Minnesota School of Federalism, we must confess the di-
minished significance of American constitutional law. In a
world of falling frontiers, any national system of public law
shows merely a single face of farm team federalism.
Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 404 (1984); J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2432 (1991); John
Minor Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, Exacerbating Political Role of Federal
Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411,411-12 (1967).
433. See Briffault, supra note 132.
434. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2405 (1997) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
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